5. Suppose health status ("healthy" or "unhealthy") represents asymmetric information: Each individual knows her or his health status, but insurance companies do not.

Now, suppose an insurance company offers only two types of policies: 1) a full-coverage policy with premium equal to the most expensive (regardless of insurance type) of the two full-coverage policies.

a. In the boxes below, calculate expected utility for a "healthy" individual, for each scenario:

No Insurance:

Most Expensive Full-Coverage Policy (Option 1):

Least Expensive Deductible Policy (Option 2):

b. In the boxes below, calculate expected utility for an "unhealthy" individual, for each scenario:

No Insurance:

Most Expensive Full-Coverage Policy (Option 1):

Least Expensive Deductible Policy (Option 2):

c. Based on your answers in 5a. and 5b., which option would a representative member of each group (i.e. "healthy" and "unhealthy") choose?

d. In the box below, enter the insurance company's expected economic profit from selling the desired policy (from the individual's perspective) to a member of each group.

Expected Profit from "Healthy":

Expected Profit from "Unhealthy":