7. Price-discriminating monopolist Kenji, a retiree, owns and lives in the desert on a plece of land that isn't worth much. One day, a giant meteorite falls in the middle of his property. As it turns out, two groups of people are interested in visiting the meteorite: scientists (Market A) and tourists (Market B). Kenji decides to sell tickets to visit the meteorite in both Market A and Market B. He stays home all day anyway, so collecting money from visitors isn't a problem for him, Therefore, you can assume he has zero costs. Also, Kenfi has a very good memory and will allow only the person who bought each ticket to use it. Thus, you can assume that all tickets are nontransferable. The demand and marginal revenue curves for the two markets are shown on the following two graphs. PRICE IN MARKET A (Dollars per ticket) PRICEIN MARKET B (Dollars per ticket) Assume Kenji has to charge the same ticket price in each of the two markets. If he sets a price of $4 per ticket, the total quantity demanded in both markets will be tickets per hour. Now, assume Kenfi can price discriminate by charging a different price in each market. Because Kenji has no costs, he chooses prices for scientists and tourists that maximize his total revenue. In order to maximize revenue, Kenji should charoe per ticket in Market A and per ticket in Market B. At these prices, he will sell a total of tickets per hour. Refer to your answers to the previous two questions. Assume Kenfi decides that he wants to limit admission to 8 people per hour, but he still wants to generate the most revenue possible. If Kenfi is forced to charge everyone the same price, he will earn revenues of per hour. If he can price discriminate by charging a different price in each market, he can earn revenues of up to per hour. Kenjl charges a higher price in the market with price elasticity of demand