(8) For each situation, solve whether collusion is sustainable using * trigger strategy" (infinitely repeated) NOTE: For each of these exercises, you need to calculate { collusion , T cheat , t punished } and see if the incentive compatibility inequality (condition for collusion to occur as a Nash equilibrium) is satisfied. 8a) Stage Game is Bertrand with Homogeneous Product; cost same as before but overall demand is Q(P) = 375 - 15 P and given S =0.9 8b) Same as 4a) but given 6 =0.5 8c) Stage Game is Cournot; Joe and Sarah have a constant MC P(Q) = 20 - 0.1 x Q where Q = Qjoe + Qsarah and given S =0.9 8d) Same as 4c) above but given S =0.5 8e) Try 4c) and 4d) assuming Sarah's MC = $5 but Joe's MC = $8. They both collude on Sarah's Monopoly Output