882 A.2d 227 (2005)

Tiffany CHILDS, et al., Appellants, v. Samuel B. PURLL, Jr., et al., Appellees.

No. 03-CV-1451.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued March 8, 2005.

Decided September 8, 2005.

230*230Jason A. Kerpelman, Washington, for appellants.

David A. Carter, with whom Douglas C. Meister, Riverdale, MD, was on the brief, for appellees Samuel B. Purll, Jr., and Kathy A. Purll.

Larissa N. Miller, with whom Frank F. Daily, Hunt Valley, was on the brief, for appellees Willoughby Real Estate Company, Lawrence F. Willoughby, Robert K. Willoughby, and David R. Willoughby.

Before WASHINGTON, Chief Judge,^[*]and TERRY and GLICKMAN, Associate Judges.

GLICKMAN, Associate Judge:

This is an appeal from an award of summary judgment to the defendants in an action for damages on account of lead poisoning. We reverse the judgment in part and remand for further proceedings.

Between December 1991 and October 1995, appellants Marcella Childs and her two minor children, Tiffany Childs and Robbie Davis, resided as tenants in an apartment at 1411 Ridge Place in Southeast Washington, D.C. The property was owned by appellees Samuel and Kathy Purll and managed by appellee Willoughby Real Estate Company ("Willoughby"). Appellants' lease agreements identified Willoughby as the landlord and lessor and listed each member of the Childs family by name as an occupant of the premises. It was stated in the leases that Tiffany and Robbie were one and three years old, respectively, at the start of the tenancy in 1991. In August 1993, mid-way through the tenancy, tests revealed that the two children had elevated levels of lead in their blood in other words, they had lead poisoning.

Attributing her children's lead poisoning to their exposure to lead-based paint at 1411 Ridge Place, Marcella Childs filed suit against the Purlls, Willoughby, and the management company's three principals^[1]in February 2000.

Her voluminous231*231complaint^[2]charged each defendant with negligence in failing to eradicate a lead paint hazard that persisted on the walls and other surfaces throughout the premises, failing to prevent the paint from chipping, peeling and flaking, and failing to warn her of the resulting dangers "thereby rendering the dwelling unsafe and dangerous, and unfit for human habitation, especially for children of tender years." The complaint further asserted that, for leasing the dwelling in a grossly defective and unreasonably dangerous condition, the defendants were strictly liable without regard to negligence. In addition, the complaint alleged that the defendants had violated the Consumer Protection Procedures Act^[3]by misrepresenting that appellants' apartment complied with the District of Columbia Housing Regulations despite the fact that it contained "flaking, loose or peeling paint or plaster, or lead-based paint accessible to children."

As a consequence of the defendants' actions, Ms. Childs alleged, her children had ingested lead-based paint and paint dust and, as a result, had suffered permanent brain damage and other serious injuries for which they were entitled to compensation. Ms. Childs also sought compensation for herself for the anguish she had suffered watching her children undergo painful drug tests and therapy, the expenses she had incurred for their medical care, and the loss of her children's services. Along with compensatory damages, the complaint requested punitive damages and, under the Consumer Protection Procedures Act, treble damages and reasonable attorneys' fees.

Following a lengthy period of discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment on multiple grounds. Appellants failed to file a timely opposition to the motions. Therein, trial court granted defendant summary judgment on appellants' cause of action for negligence based on their claimed lack of notice of the leased paint hazard at the leased premise.

The Housing regulations impose numerous duties on landlords and their agents to keep residential premises safe and habitable and to not rent habitations that are unsafe. Of particular pertinence to this case, during the time appellant resided at 1411 Ridge place, housing regulations 707.3 of title 14 provided as follows:

The owner of any residential premises in which there resides a child under the age of eight years... Shall maintain the interior and exterior surfaces of the residential premises free of lead or lead in its compounds in any quantity exceeding five-tenths (0.5) of one percent (1% ) of the total weight of the material of more than seven-tenths of a milligram per square centimeter (0.7 mg/cm2), or in any quantity sufficient to constitute a hazard to the health of any resident of the residential premises or any regular visitor to the residential premises who spends a substantial portion of his her time in the residential premises.

In 707.3, we have before us a particular Housing Regulation that is designed to protect public safety and that requires landlords to be proactive when its specified preconditions are satisfied. Upon notification that the prospective tenants of 1411 Ridge Place would include children under eight years of age, 707.3 imposed a specific, affirmative duty on the owners and their agents to provide those premises to the Childs family in a lead-free condition or not at all.^[15]Although the Purlls and their management company may not have known there was lead paint in the premises, "actual knowledge [of the defect] is not required for liability; it is enough if, in the exercise of reasonable care, appellee[s] should have known that the condition ... violated the standards of the Housing Code." In effect, 707.3 presumptively serves to put the landlord on constructive notice of any lead paint hazard in premises occupied by children under eight.

In sum, the requirement of constructive notice is satisfied in this case, given 707.3 and the notice to the landlord that two young children would be residing in the leased premises. Further, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the owners and their agents in this case have demonstrated that the alleged violation of a regulation designed to promote public safety was "excusable under the circumstances or [that] other acts of due care negate the negligence implied by the statutory violation." In seeking summary judgment, the defendants have not presented evidence that they "did everything a reasonably prudent person would have done to comply with" 707.3. We therefore are persuaded that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on appellants' cause of action for negligence based on their claimed lack of notice of the lead paint hazard at the leased premises. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment.

CRITICAL THINKING

Answer the following five questions (20 points each) after reading the case summary above. Typ e your 1 to 2 paragraph response(s) below each of the questions and answer all parts of each question.

1. What is a summary judgment? Why are summary judgments often overturned on appeal?

1. Under the code section in this case, what duty is imposed on a landlord before renting property? Do you think this duty is reasonable or excessive? Why?

1. What is "constructive notice" or the doctrine of "constructive notice"? How does it differ from "actual notice"?

1. How does the doctrine of "constructive notice" apply in this case?

1. While Blood Lead Levels (BLLs) have decreased in all children over the past 30 years, disparities in who has elevated BLLs persist, disproportionately impacting vulnerable groups, such as immigrant children, low-income families, and young children from ethnic and racial minorities. Provide two recommendations as to what can and should be done to rid this disproportionate result?