9 Econ 443 x + v 7 x 6 9 0' 632144 C:/Users/yongj/Desktop/Econ%20448%20Problem%205et%203.nb.htm| I? r *. '1 g V macroeconomksz... 0 iimm... .l MLAWorksCited... e TheCommonAp... 1w? Yul'i" VourAccountSu... i gamma... 0 Pinterest wt Twice EyesWide... UWGlobal Month... doyoudo You can submit your answers to these in a separate document from the data questions below or you can use markdown to write equations using similar syntax to LaTex. (c.f. https://rmd4sci.njtierneycom/math) 1. Consider Weiss' model of household production in a marriage between two people a and b with wages w\" and 10b (p. 84), but with constant returns to scale in production. Total household production is Z = W and both partners face the budget constraint 2:,- = wihi and time constraint t,- + h,- = 1 for i=a,b. Solve for Z in the following situations: 11 Household members have different comparative advantages in market work(wa > 101,) and the person with the higher market earnings devotes all of her time to market work while the person with lower market earnings devotes all of his time to home production. 1.2 All household members have the same comparative advantage in market work (111a = wb) and both partners spend 1/2 of theirtime in market work and 1/2 of theirtime in home production. 2. How do the gains from marriage differ in problem 1 from the increasing returns to scale situation examined in class? Be specic about both cases. 3. One version of a family's common preferences utility function can be U(cm, cf) : cl =0: 0537'!) Where cm and cf are the consumption of the family's product (Z) for person m and person f, respectively. 3.1 If the family wants to choose cm and of to maximize their utility subject to budget constraint Zm f : cm + cf, solve for their optimal choice of consumptions. 3.2 Using the results from Weiss's model (solved in lecture and the reading) that an individual is consumption of 2 outside of marriage is iwi, and the couple's total married consumption is max(wm, wf), nd the gains from marriage for both parties if w," = wf = w (your answer will be in terms of w and a). 4. In a bargaining model of household decision-making, the couple jointly maximizes the following utility function: U = [U (Cm) 7 Tm] * [U(Cf) 7 Ti] Subject to Y = Cm + 0;, where Y is total family income Person f is the female partner and m is the male partner 4.1 In Nancy Qian's paper, which variable in the preceding model changes as a direct consequence of an increase in tea prices in China? 4.2 What other model variables will be affected following this change? 4.3 What do Qian's findings regarding girls' survival suggest about the female partners preferences in this model? 4.4 How does Qian justify rejecting the unitary model of household decisionmaking in this paper? = pmxgggggmg ' A O :1 e 2.. a n S a @ C. Q, mStartwatchlist A.'I

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