9. There are two types of racers-tortoises and hareswho race against one another in randomly drawn pairs. In this world, hares beat tortoises every time without fail. If two hares race they tie, and they are completely exhausted by the race. When two tortoises race they also tie, but they enjoy a pleasant conversation along the way. The payoff table is as follows (where c > 0): Tortoise C,C Hare -2,1 0,0 Tortoise Hare 1,-2 a. For what values of c are tortoises fitter than hares if t, the proportion of racers who are tortoises, is 0.5? b. For what values of c are tortoises fitter than hares if t is 0.1? c. If c = 1, will a single hare successfully invade a population of pure tortoises? Explain why or why not. d. In terms of t, how large must c be for tortoises to be fitter than hares? e. In terms of c, what is the level of t in a mixed strategy equilibrium? For what values of c will such an equilibrium exist? Will this equilibrium be evolutionarily stable? 10. Find all the ESSs, in pure and mixed strategies, of the following game: A B C A 0,0 2,1 0,0 B 1,2 0,0 0,0 C 0,0 0,0 1,1