(a) (b) (C) Derive each rm's best response function. Find the Cournot equilibrium. What is the prot of each rm under the Cournot equilibrium? Now suppose that rm 1 hires a new manager. This manager in- eXplicably believes that rms should maximize revenue, not prots, despite claiming to have an eCOnOmiCS degree. As such, rm 1 and rm 2 now play a game where rm 1 chooses ql to maximize its total revenue, while rm 2 (as before) chooses 12 to maximize its prots. Find the Nash equilibrium of this new game. Cournot with revenue-maximizing manager: There are 2 firms in an industry producing identical products. The market inverse demand curve is P(Q) = 10 - Q where Q = q1 + 92. Each firm has a constant marginal cost of c = 2. The firms compete in quantities (Cournot competition)