Question
(a) Can we use 'majority voting' as a general mechanism for constructing social preferences from individual preferences? (10 marks) (b) State Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. (5
(a) Can we use 'majority voting' as a general mechanism for constructing social preferences from individual preferences? (10 marks)
(b) State Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. (5 marks)
(c) How to overcome the hurdle posed by Arrow's Theorem for analysts ? (10 marks)
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Income Tax Fundamentals 2013
Authors: Gerald E. Whittenburg, Martha Altus Buller, Steven L Gill
31st Edition
1111972516, 978-1285586618, 1285586611, 978-1285613109, 978-1111972516
