A case Summary of Oilfields Workers' Trade Union and B. P. (Formerly B.P. Amoco Energy Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago)

Jurisdiction	Trinidad & Tobago
Court	Industrial Relations Court
Judge	Khan, P.
Judgment Date	17 October 2001
Date	17 October 2001
Docket Number	Trade Dispute No. 125 of 2001

Industrial Court

Khan, P.

Trade Dispute No. 125 of 2001

Oilfields Workers' Trade Union

and

B. P. (Formerly B.P. Amoco Energy Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago)

Facts:

Khan, P.

1

By letter dated April 30, 1998, B.P. (formerly B.P. Amoco Energy Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago) (the Company) dismissed Don Phillips (the worker) from its service. At the time of his dismissal, the worker had approximately 11 years and 4 months' service with the Company and was employed as an Offshore Platform Production Operator receiving approximately $7,500.00 per month in salary and allowances.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WORKER'S DISMISSAL

2

The basic facts that led to the worker's dismissal are in a small compass. On April 14, 1998, Anthony Sylvester saw the worker viewing the television in his room on the Company's offshore platform. Subsequently, Sylvester discovered a videotape which he had in the room missing. Sylvester asked the worker about the videotape but the worker denied any knowledge of it. Terrence Hinds, who was the apparent owner of the videotape, also asked the worker about the whereabouts of the videotape but the worker also denied any knowledge of it. On April 15, 1998, the worker met Hinds at Mayaro Junction as they were both going off duty for a period of seven (7) days and told Hinds that he knew where the video tape was and he would get it when he returned offshore. On April 22, 1998, when the worker returned offshore, he handed the video tape to Hinds.

3

The Company conducted an investigation and heard the worker's explanation before dismissing him from its service and at the time of the investigation, the Company knew that the worker had returned the videotape on April 22, 1998.

MY FINDINGS ON THE EVIDENCE

4

I find that the worker contributed in large measure to his dismissal by refusing to disclose the whereabouts of the videotape until approximately eight days after the videotape was discovered to be missing. He says it was a prank. In my opinion, it was an act of stupidity, which, without explanation, would have caused the Company to have serious doubts about his honesty and integrity. I am unable, however, on the evidence, to say that the worker was dishonest. There was no evidence that he had removed the videotape from the Company's offshore platform and there is insufficient evidence to show that he intended to deprive the owner of the videotape of it permanently. In my judgment, it was an inconsiderate and uncaring act but the Company knew before it dismissed the worker that the worker had voluntarily returned the videotape to Hinds and the Company should have taken this fact into account in making its decision.

5

On the whole of the facts, and in equity and good conscience, and having regard to all the relevant criteria stipulated in the Industrial Relations Act, Chap. 88:01 "the Act", I find that the Company dismissed the worker in circumstances that were harsh and oppressive and contrary to the principles of good industrial relations practice.

THE RELEVANT LAW

6

So far as material for present purposes, section 10(3) of the Act declares

• "(3) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or in any other rule of law to the contrary, the court in the exercise of its powers shall
  • (a) make such order or award in relation to a dispute before it as it considers fair and just, having regard to the interests of the persons immediately concerned and the community as a whole.
  • (b) act in accordance with equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case before it, having regard to the principles and practices of good industrial relations.
• (4) Notwithstanding any rule of law to the contrary, but subject to subsections (5) and (6), in addition to its jurisdiction and powers under this Part, the court may, in any dispute concerning the dismissal of a worker, order the re-employment or re-instatement (in his former or a similar position) of any worker, subject to such conditions as the court thinks fit to impose, or the payment of compensation or damages whether or not in lieu of such re-employment or re-instatement, or the payment of exemplary damages in lieu of such re-employment or re-instatement.
• (5) An order under subsection (4) may be made where, in the opinion of the court, a worker has been dismissed in circumstances that are harsh and oppressive or not in accordance with the principles of good industrial relations practice; and in the case of an order for compensation or damages, the court in making an assessment thereon shall not be bound to follow any rule of law of law for the assessment of compensation or damages and the court may make an assessment that is in its opinion fair and appropriate.
• (6) The opinion of the court as to whether a worker has been dismissed in circumstances that are harsh and oppressive or not in accordance with the principles of good industrial relations practice and any order for compensation or damages including assessment
• thereof made pursuant to subsection (5) shall not be challenged, appealed against, renewed, quashed or called in question in any court on any account whatever."

THE RELEVANT FACTORS

7

In my judgment in Trade Dispute No. 2 of 2001 between Banking, Insurance and General Workers Trade Union and Hindu Credit Union Co-operative Society Limited [Dated July 31, 2001], I set out some of the relevant principles which are usually taken into account in deciding on the appropriate order which the court should make when it fords a dismissal to be harsh and oppressive or contrary to the principles of good industrial relations practice. In addition to those principles, the court should also take into consideration whether or not the worker has, as in this case, contributed to his dismissal.

MY ORDER

8

On the whole of the evidence, and taking all of the above matters into account, and for the reasons I have given herein, and bearing in mind particularly my finding that the worker contributed to his own dismissal, I hereby order the Company, at its option, either to re-employ the worker with effect from November 1, 2001 as a new employee in a position similar to the one he held on the date of his dismissal or pay to the worker on or before November 1, 2001, in lieu of re-employment, damages of NINETY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($90,000.00) which, in my judgment, is a just, fair and appropriate award of damages for his dismissal, if not re-employed, having regard to the circumstances of this particular case.

Link to the case: https://tt.vlex.com/vid/oilfields-workers-trade-union-794011797