A manufacturer of ash drives has a prot function 1r : t 10412 where t is the price charged for a flash drive and 10912 is the cost of producing a drive whose capacity is qgigabytes. A consumer of type I9 has a utility function u : 6g t. where 9 takes on a value of 12 for H-type consumers. or W for Ltype consumers. There are 'lO consumers of each type. A consumer gets zero utility if she does not buy. If a consumer is indifferent between buying two ash drives, assume she will buy the one With more gigabytes. If a consumer is indifferent between buying a ash drive and not buying, assume she will buy. Answer the following. If rounding is needed, round to 3 decimal points. a) (0.25 point) Suppose [q'm fL) is the optimal {profit maximising) capacity-price bundle for Ltype consumer under complete information. What is the value of f1}? H b) (025 point) Suppose (gig, f3] is the optimal (prot maximising} capacity-price bundle for Htype consumer under complete information. What is the value of 3? H c} (0.25 points) What is the seller's overall prot under complete information? H For part d) - i). assume information is asymmetric. d) (05 point) Suppose that the seller continues to offer the capacity-price bundles that maximises his prot under complete information: that is. he offers (13, 1.) and (gig, {3]. What is the utility for the type 91: consumer from buying the (rig, t3) bundle? That is, what is maa, 35)? e) (0.5 points) What is the utility for the type 6'3 consumer from buying the (EL, 31.] bundle? That is. what is uH[L, 31,)? f) (0.5 point} What are the seller's profits if he offers the bundles (1371.35) and \"EB: 3) when information is asymmetric? Now suppose the seller decides to offer a menu of capacityprice bundles ('11.: t5] and (gig, tn) to incentives the two types of consumers to sort themselves out. Answer part 9) to i) in this context. g) (1 point) For Hitype consumer, what is the optimal (prot maximising] level of 43;? h} {1 point) Suppose [qf ti) is the optimal (prot maximising) capacity-price bundle for L-type consumer under asymmetric information. What is the value of 151? i} (0.25 points) What is the seller's overall prot under asymmetric information if the seller offers a menu of prot maximizing capacity-price bundles (, #1,) and [(111, $3) to consumers