Answered step by step
Verified Expert Solution
Link Copied!

Question

1 Approved Answer

A manufacturer of flash drives has a profit function = 1 - 6q where t is the price charged for a flash drive and q

image text in transcribed
image text in transcribed
A manufacturer of flash drives has a profit function = 1 - 6q" where t is the price charged for a flash drive and q is the cost of producing a drive whose capacity is q gigabytes. A consumer of type O has a utility function u = 0q - 1, where 0 takes on a value of 12 for H-type consumers, or 8 for L-type consumers. There are 10 consumers of each type. A consumer gets zero utility if she does not buy. Answer the following. If rounding is needed, round to 3 decimal points. a) (0.25 point) Suppose (qL, 1 1) is the optimal (profit maximising) capacity-price bundle for L-type consumer under complete information. What is the value of t L? b) (0.25 point) Suppose (q H, 1 H ) is the optimal (profit maximising) capacity-price bundle for H-type consumer under complete information. What is the value of t H ? c) (0.5 points) What is the seller's overall profit under complete information? For part d) - i), assume information is asymmetric. d) (0.5 point) Suppose that the seller continues to offer the capacity-price bundles that maximises his profit under complete information: that is, he offers (qL, IL ) and (q H, IH ). What is the utility for the type Of consumer from buying the (q H, TH ) bundle? That is, what is un(q H, TH)? e) (1 points) What is the utility for the type Of consumer from buying the (91, IL ) bundle? That is, what is u H (qL, IL)? f) (1 point) What are the seller's profits if he offers the bundles (qL, i1) and (q H, TH ) when information is asymmetric? Now suppose the seller decides to offer a menu of capacity-price bundles (q1, (1) and (qH, TH ) to incentives the two types of consumers to sort themselves out. Answer part g) to i) in this context. g) (1 point) For H-type consumer, what is the optimal (profit maximising) level of qH? h) (1 point) Suppose (q), 17 ) is the optimal (profit maximising) capacity-price bundle for L-type consumer under asymmetric information. What is the value of 1) ? i) (0.5 points) What is the seller's overall profit under asymmetric information if the seller offers a menu of profit maximizing capacity-price bundles (qL, IL) and (qH, TH) to consumers

Step by Step Solution

There are 3 Steps involved in it

Step: 1

blur-text-image

Get Instant Access to Expert-Tailored Solutions

See step-by-step solutions with expert insights and AI powered tools for academic success

Step: 2

blur-text-image

Step: 3

blur-text-image

Ace Your Homework with AI

Get the answers you need in no time with our AI-driven, step-by-step assistance

Get Started

Recommended Textbook for

Macroeconomics Policy And Practice

Authors: Frederic Mishkin

2nd Edition

0133424316, 978-0133424317

More Books

Students also viewed these Economics questions