A manufacturer of flash drives has a profit function * = f - 10q- where : is the price charged for a flash drive and q is the cost of producing a drive whose capacity is q gigabytes. A consumer of type O has a utility function u = 0q - 1, where 0 takes on a value of 13 for H-type consumers, or 9 for L-type consumers. There are 10 consumers of each type. A consumer gets zero utility if she does not buy. Answer the following. If rounding is needed, round to 3 decimal points.Suppose that the seller continues to offer the capacity-price bundles that maximises his profit under complete information: that is, he offers (q ,, f ) and (9 17, ( #). What is the utility for the type Of consumer from buying the (q H, ( H ) bundle? That is, what is un. (q H, 1H)?What are the seller's profits if he offers the bundles (EL, ELL} and [$11, EH] when information is asymmetric? Now suppose the seller decides to offer a menu of capacity-price bundles (q, 12) and (q#, ty) to incentives the two types of consumers to sort themselves out. Answer part g) to i) in this context.g) (1 point) For H-type consumer, what is the optimal (profit maximising) level of qH? 0.65 h) (1 point) Suppose (q; , 1; ) is the optimal (profit maximising) capacity-price bundle for L-type consumer under asymmetric information. What is the value of ti ? 2.25 i) (0.5 points) What is the seller's overall profit under asymmetric information if the seller offers a menu of profit maximizing capacity-price bundles (qL, IL) and (qH, (# ) to consumers? 48.5