A manufacturer of flash drives has a profit function at = t 7g2 where t is the price charged for a flash drive and q2 is the cost of producing a drive whose capacity is q gigabytes. A consumer of type 9 has a utility function u = 6g t, where 3 takes on a value of 15 for H-type consumers, or 9 for L-type consumers. There are 10 consumers of each type. A consumer gets zero utility if she does not buy. Answer the following. If rounding is needed, round to 3 decimal points. a) (0.25 point) Suppose (EjL, fL) is the optimal (profit maximising) capacity-price bundle for L-type consumer under complete information. What is the value of tL ? b) (0.25 point) Suppose (6H, $3) is the optimal (profit maximising) capacity-price bundle for H- type consumer under complete information. What is the value of tH ? c) (0.5 points) What is the seller's overall profit under complete information? For part d) - i), assume information is asymmetric. d) (0.5 point) Suppose that the seller continues to offer the capacity-price bundles that maximises his profit under complete information: that is, he offers (5L, tL) and (6H, tH). What is the utility for the type 9,; consumer from buying the (g, f3) bundle? That is, what is uL('H, fH)? e) (1 points) What is the utility for the type 03 consumer from buying the (9%, 14) bundle? That is, what is \"RUE, tL)? f) (1 point) What are the seller's profits if he offers the bundles (L, fL) and (@1133) when information is asymmetric? Now suppose the seller decides to offer a menu of capacity-price bundles (qL, tL) and (qH, tH ) to incentives the two types of consumers to sort themselves out. Answer part g) to i) in this context. g) (1 point) For H -type consumer, what is the optimal (profit maximising) level of qH ? h) (1 point) Suppose (qi, t* ) is the optimal (profit maximising) capacity-price bundle for L-type consumer under asymmetric information. What is the value of t* ? i) (0.5 points) What is the seller's overall profit under asymmetric information if the seller offers a menu of profit maximizing capacity-price bundles (qL, tL) and (qH, tH ) to consumers