A manufacturer of flash drives has a prot function x = f (:inI where i' is the price charged for a flash drive and .ql2 is the cost of producing a drive whose capacity is r; gigabytes. A consumer of type 9 has a utility function u = Sq r, where 6' takes on a value of 12 for Htype consumers, or 10 for L-type consumers. There are 1|) consumers of each type. A consumer gets zero utilityI if she does not buy. Answer the following. If rounding is needed, round to 9 decimal points. a: [0.25 point] Suppose (til, FL) is the optimal [prot maximising} capacity-price bundle for L-type consumer under complete information. What is the value of FL? |:| b} [0.25 point] Suppose ($3.551) is the optimal (profit maximising: capacity-price bundle for H-type consumer under complete infon'riation. What is the value of PH? D c: (0.5 points] What is the seller's overall profit under complete infon'riation? D For part d] - i}, assume infon'nation is asymmetric. d} [0.5 point] Suppose that the seller continues to offer the capacity-price bundles that maximises his prot under complete information: that is, he offers (L. FL) and (13",?3). What is the utility for the type l9; consumer from buying the (timr') bundle? That isI what is Ra\