A prospective employee (Player 1) is talking with an employer (Player 2) who says, Lets have lunch. There are two restaurants where they could meet, A and B. Player 1 would prefer Restaurant A as it is cheaper. Player 2 would prefer restaurant B as the food is better. Player 1 really wants to meet Player 2. Player 2s preferences are unknown to Player 1 (but of course known to Player 2). Player 1 estimates that Player 2 wants to meet with probability . The payoff matrices are:

Player 2 wants to meet:

P1 \ P2	A	B
A	3,2	1,1
B	0,0	2,3

Player 2 does not want to meet:

P1 \ P2	A	B
A	3,0	1,3
B	0,2	2,1

Assuming the assumptions are present to justify a Bayesian game, determine the pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibria and the range of values for each.

Determine a mixed strategy equilibrium for this scenario.