A prospective employee (Player 1) is talking with an employer (Player 2) Who says, "Let's have lunch." There are two restaurants where they could meet, A and B. Player 1 would prefer Restaurant A as it is cheaper. Player 2 would prefer restaurant B as the food is better. Player 1 really wants to meet Player 2. Player 2's preferences are unknown to Player 1 (but of course known to Player 2). Player 1 estimates that Player 2 wants to meet with probability ?. The payoff matrices are: Player 2 Want to Meet Player 2 Does Not Want to Meet P1 P2 A B P1 P2 A B A 3, 2 1, 1 A 3, 0 1, 3 B 0, 0 2, 3 B 0, 2 2, 1 Assuming the assumptions are present to justify a Bayesian game, determine the pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibria and the range of ? values for each. Determine a mixed strategy equilibrium for this scenario