(a) Represent the above game in normal form and find all its Nash Equilibria in pure strategies. (b) Do the equilibriums that you have found in question 1 above maximize the total social utility (the total social utility is given by Up(x],X2) = V1(X1,*) + Uz(X2, xc)? Justify your answer.3. The municipality of Madrid is organizing an operation called \"Madrid Verde\". In a street ofChamartim each family that has a house there will get two trees. |rClInly two neighbors live on this street If only two houses}. Each of the Mo neighbors must decide how many of these trees he will plant in his garden (in which case you cannot see the trees from the street] and how many he will plant in the entrance of his house {in which case you can see the trees from the street}. The trees that can be seen from the street contribute to the revaluationr'improvement of the neighborhood. Neighbor 2 values more than neighbor l the trees that can be seen from the street because he intends to sell his house soon. Suppose that the decision of each neighbor is private and that once they have planted the trees they cannot change their position. Let x1 and 1'; denote the number of trees that Neighbor 1 and Neighbor 2, respectively, has decided to plant in his garden. Let xc denote the number of trees that can be seen from the street. The utility lncticn of Neighbor 1 is given by Upixvxp} = x1{1,5 + If) and that of Neighbor 2 by Uxmxf) = x: (1,5 + HIE), where a. 2:- 1