According to the articles attached:What were the reasons why the IMF wanted Indonesia to reform the bankruptcy law?

C. Enactment of Reform Policies In the present discussion, the legal policy for reforming the Bankruptcy Act will be limited to a discussion on the policy of enactment. Several enactment policies had already been formulated when the government decided to reform the Bankruptcy Act. However, the decisive factor came from the IMF. Therefore, the policy is commonly referred to as the IMF-influenced enact- ment policy. The IMF had requested the reform of the Bankruptcy Act, since it considered that Indonesia lacked a proper or appropriate legal mechanism for quick. transparent, and effective resolution of debt problems. The IMF considered that the Bankruptcy Act reform was important for at least two reasons: first, the sheer size of Indonesia's private sector short-term debts." These private debts, once matured, were considered to be a further threat to the ailing Indonesian economy. In anticipation of the pending problems associated with the high level of public and private debts, the IMF insisted that Indonesia should develop debt-restructuring mechanisms. Indonesia complied with the IMF insis- tence and several debt-restructuring mechanisms were developed; namely, the Frank- furt Agreement, the Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA), and the Jakarta Initiative Task Force (JITF). However, these mechanisms were of a voluntary na- ture and led to out-of-court settlements. A court mechanism was considered to be important to complement the existing mechanisms, especially when such mecha- nisms failed. For this reason, reform of the 1905 Bankruptcy Act was deemed nec- essary. The second reason was that a workable Bankruptcy Act was perceived as a means to force debtors to enter into negotiation with their creditors. Traditionally, in Indo- nesia, debtors very often ignored the demands of their creditors without any fear of reprisals or repercussions arising from their recalcitrance. However, in retrospect, the objective of the Bankruptcy Act reform requested by the IMF was more to protect creditors than to avoid the adverse effects of matured private debts on the Indonesian economy. Even under the current and still unwork-able Bankruptcy Act. the predicted dire effects of matured private debts on the Indonesian economy never materialized. Hence. the IMF-influenced enactment policy was at hen arbitrary and transitory. In addition. the IMF or its advisers were not careful enough when they pre- scribed the Bankruptcy Act reform without having a thorough understanding of the legal problems peculiar to the Indonesian context. The nature of law in Indonesia is very different from what it is in developed countries. In Indonesia. one cannot just enact a law and instantly expect that the behavior of the society will change in accordance with the new law. In addition. the legal infrastructure in Indonesia is associated with a number of shortcomings and consequently. it cannot be mason- ably expected that improvements will expedited immediately. The objective of the enactment policy advocated by the IMF was mainly to pro tect the interests of foreign creditors. This can be clearly observed in the provision of Anicle l t I} of the Bankruptcy Act which does not consider whether a debtor is solvent or insolvent. The only requirement of the article is that the debtor merely has failed to repay one of its debts. Theoretically. in this sense. a debtor can be declared bankrupt and. subsequently. his assets can be liquidated in spite of the fact that the debtor ntay in fact be technically solvent. This is irrespective of whether the debtor owns assets with a much higher value than its liabilities. This logic deviates considerably from the basic policy of most bankruptcy laws in which the emphasis is normally placed on rehabilitating the debtor who is in distress rather than on liquidating the assets for the sole purpose of the payment of on: single debt even in cases where the debtor is solvent. By drafting a Bankruptcy Act that disregarded issues of solvency. it could rea- sonably be consulted as having been drafted to make it easier for foreign creditors to have Indonesian debtors facing a nancial crisis declared bankrupt. Hence. the Bankruptcy Act provided protection to foreign creditors but did not provide a fair treatment or equal protection to Indonesian debtors from overzealous creditor ac- ttons. As for the govenunent. the enactment policy was simple. The government was forced to reform the Bankruptcy Act or it would have to face the consequences of not receiving the desperately needed loan disbursements from the IMF.\" In this sense. the government executed the reform half-beanedty.Bill Delay in loan disburse ments would have meant a loss of condence from foreign investors in Indonesia and its economic and legal institutions. Nevertheless. the formal language used in the reform was to respond to sturietal needs. in view of the national interest anti the continued effort to amend obsolete Dutch colonial laws.\" Actually. societal needs had never been the driving force behind the reform of the Bankruptcy Act. Consequently. the reform did not received a wide public sup- port." For many Indonesians. including the Indonesian business community. the reform was not absolume necessary. It had never been considered as part of the solution to manage the economic crisis. To the contrary. the Bankruptcy Act reform had been perceived as a means for foreign creditors to conveniently take over Indo- nesian businesses\" One argument. although it is not the only argument. to support this contention is that the economic crisis had illustrated the inability of companies to pay their for- eign ctn'rency loans. Prior to the economic crisis. as the exchange rates were rela- tively stable. there were only a few cases of inability to repay a debt. However. when the crisis hit indonesia. exchange rates depreciated considerably without the government being able to control them.\" Therefore. the foreign currency loans of local (rupiah) currency income of companies had to he paid at least at a triple rate. and in some instances even at a higher rate than that in local currency terms. This was the case irrespective of the fact that a company's performance was maintained to provide a stable income. Hence. the economic crisis resulted in the inability. but not necessarily unwillingness. of many Indonesian companies to pay their foreign currency loans