Alex wants someone to take over management of his small firm so he can concentrate on other things. He knows that if the new manager works hard, there's an 80% chance the business will make $1,000 profit, but a 20% chance it might make $400 instead. If the manager shirks, there's a 20% chance of making $1,000 profit, but an 80% chance of making only $400. He's interviewed Maya for the job and found out that she really doesn't like putting in a lot of effort. Maya has a unique way of evaluating her satisfaction with her job. She has a square root utility function, which means she values income differently based on how much effort she puts in. Specifically, if she works hard, her disutility of effort is 4.5. However, if she shirks, her disutility of effort decreases to only 2. Alex is thinking of offering Maya a salary of $200 plus a 20% share of net income. This way, if the business does well, Maya will get more money. If Alex's business has shares traded publicly, would you recommend a compensation arrangement that considers both net income and share price performance, considering if net income is determined using historical costs or fair value methods. Provide an explanation why for both