An individual can be of highability (H) with probability 0.2 or low~abi|ity (L) with probability 0. Only the individual herself knows her actual skill. The individual can choose whether to get an undergraduate degree (U) or not lN ). Obtaining such a degree does not change the individual's ability level and is painful for everyone. Suppose the cost (or pain) for a high-ability individual is (H = 3 and CL = 9 for a law-ability individual. An employer is writing up a job advertisement. In this advertisement, it species two things: wage wand degree requirement. A high-ability individual is of value 15 for the employer and a law-ability individual is of value 2. The minimum wage the employer can offer is 5. An individual maximizes the difference between her wage and education cost. If an individual is not hired. her payoff is 0. An employer maximizes the difference between the expected value generated by an individual and the wage paid to her. Assume that if wage equals education cast, the individual applies for the job. (a) (5 points) Can the employer be protable if it does not require an undergraduate degree? lb) I5 points) Suppose the employer sets w e 6, and requires an undergraduate degree. What is its expected prot from a hired employee? (C) (5 points) Suppose the employer sets w = 10, and requires an undergraduate degree. What is its expected prot from a hired employee? id) [10 points) How would the employer write the advertisement to maximize the expected prot from a hired employee