ANY HELP with the last two answers would be much appreciated.

Imagine that the flat-screen TV market is made up of one large firm that leads the industry and sets its own price first, and another firm that follows the leader when deciding its own profit-maximizing strategy. The leader has a cost function of CL(qL) = 5qL, and the follower has a cost function of CF(qF) = LE = 2, where Q = qL + qF. Total market demand for flat-screen TVs is given by the function Q = 1, 000.00 - 2p. Calculate the following values: Leading firm's production: q1 = 483.33 (Round to two decimals if necessary.) Follower firm's production: qF = * 258.34 (Round to two decimals if necessary.) Equilibrium price: p = * $ 189.99 (Round to two decimals if necessary.)The leading rm must forecast how the following rm will behave. By assumption, the following rm must always set the same price as the leader in equilibrium. Taking this price as given, the follower rm nds its optimal output by settingp = MC. For any price the leading rm sets, the follower rm will supply this amount; so your goal is to nd the residual demand that the leading rm will supply