Assume. in producing one unit of a good X, an agent can exert either the good effort [G] or the bad effort (L), which cause production defects with probability 0.25 or 0.?5 respectively. His utility function in effort 8 and wagew is U031 e) = 100 (10/13) C( g) were C(G) = 2 for the good effort and C(L) = [J for the bad effort. Production defects are contractible and so can be included in the agent's contract, but effort is not contractihle. Good X sells for $20 if there are no defects and $0 otherwise. The principal is risk-neutral and likes profit. Assume the agent has a reservation utilityioutside option of U=0. Assume for this question the principal wants to achieve the bad effort at the lowest cost than what is: the expected wage if effort is contractible minus the expected wage if effort is not contractible? Answer to at most 2 decimal places [rounded]. do not include a dotlar sign in your