Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player 1 can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player 2 can choose either Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following table Player 1 Top Bottom Left 6 7 5 4 Player 2 Right 9 5 4 3 where the number on the left is the payoff to Player A, and the number on the right is the payoff to Player B. A) (4 points) Does player 1 have a dominant strategy, and if so what is it? B) (4 points) Does player 2 have a dominant strategy and if so what is it? C) (4 points each) For each of the following strategy combinations, write TRUE if it is a Nash Equilibrium, and FALSE if it is not: i) Top/Left ii) Top/Right iii) Bottom/Left iv) Bottom Right D) (4 points) What is Player 1's maximin strategy? E) (4 points) What is player 2's maximin strategy? F) (4 points) If the game were played with Player 1 moving first and player 2 moving second, using the backward induction method discussed in the class notes, what strategy will each player choose?