Attached below are microeconomic questions, try and provide answers for them

(b) (4 minutes) Calculate consumer and producer surplus under trade. (5) (15 minutes) The US government is unhappy with steel imports and decides to impose a 200 percent tariff on imported steel so that the price of imported steel is now 3 when importing from abroad. (Continue to assume that the US domestic steel market operates in perfect competition with production function S(L) = ;1) (a) (2 minutes) What is the price of domestic steel? Will car manufacturers choose to use domestic or foreign steel? (b) (5 minutes) Calculate the new equilibrium in the US market for cars, continuing to assume that cars are traded freely at a world price of 100. Does the US still export cars?(b) (4 minutes) Calculate consumer and producer surplus under trade. (5) (15 minutes) The US government is unhappy with steel imports and decides to impose a 200 percent tariff on imported steel so that the price of imported steel is now 3 when importing from abroad. (Continue to assume that the US domestic steel market operates in perfect competition with production function S(L) = $1) (a) (2 minutes) What is the price of domestic steel? Will car manufacturers choose to use domestic or foreign steel? (b) (5 minutes) Calculate the new equilibrium in the US market for cars, continuing to assume that cars are traded freely at a world price of 100. Does the US still export cars? 3. Bergson becomes a benevolent dictator. He has a subjects . = 1, .. .,n with CARA utilities #1,.., Un, respectively. (Write o, for the absolute risk aversion of i.) The total wealth in the society, Y, is a function of an unknown state @ and is normally distributed with mean / and variance of. Bergson can choose any allocation ? = (21, ...;2,) such that an (@) +... +a, (w) 1 from her savings so that her wealth at t + 1 is with = " (wt - ; ) if her wealth at t is we and she consumes r, at t. (b) Find a sophisticated-optimal consumption strategy for her in which the self at any given date s consumes yu's. Compute the constant y and briefly verify that this is indeed a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the multi-agent game. (c) For 8