[B] Now suppose that Netix oifers a senior discount - that is, Netix veries whether people are old. and then charges them a separate price. This type of third-degree price discrimination allows Netix to \"split" its market into two separate markets, one for old people and one for young people. {i} 1What. is Netix's prot-mandmiziog 1:1uarl.tit;l,.r Q3 and price P3\" in the market for old people? {ii} 'What is Netix's prot-maidmizing quantity Q? and price P13\" in the market for young people? (Hint: solve for marginal revenue when P 3 3|]r and when P .1 all.) {iii} Calculate the eii'ect of Netix's third-degree price dism'imination on overall consumer surplus. Does consumer surplus increase or decrease? {iv} Would we get the same result 1with rst-degree price disorimioathjn? Monopolies and third-degree price discrimination Suppose that there are two types of consumers 1who buy a Netix subscription: old people and young people. These two age groups have different demand for streaming video. For young people, their demand is given by DF{P}=244P1iEPEEU np}: 121;}, iIPe 1where tl'le inequalitf,r is saying that every young person 1will ling,r a Netix subscription ii the price is $341) or less. 011 the other hantL the demand of old people is given by 1:191:13] = 121;! 4P Assume that Netix is a monopoly1 and the marginal cost of providing a new subscription is $13. [A] Let's consider the monopoly's problem when there is no price discrimination. {i} Derive a single market demand function for both old people and young people. (Hint: derive the mret demand curve separately for P :3 3i] and P {2 3i], and see what you get.) {ii} Solve or Netix's prot-maximising quantity Q'\" and price Pm