(b) Suppose that both players play tit for tat: Start by playing (C, C). Then in any subsequent period, each player mimics what the other person did in the previous period. For what o is this a subgame perfect equilibrium? (Use wolfram alpha if necessary. Writing out the strategy in more detail may help.) (15)4. (30) Suppose that we have the following game, repeated infinitely with a discount rate 6 for each player: Player 2 C D Player 1 C 3,3 0,5 D 5,0 1, 1 (a) Suppose that players play the following strategy: Play (C, C) in the first period. In any subsequent period, if (C, C) was played in the previous period, play (C, C). If (D, C) or (C, D) was played in the previous period, play (D, D). If, in the last two periods, (D, D) was played both times, play (C, C). (If (D, D) has only been played one time, but not twice in a row, play (D, D) again). For what o is this a subgame perfect equilibrium? (Use wolfram alpha if necessary.) (15)