(b) Write the game tree for this game (assume that it is played sequen- tially), with Coke moving first and Pepsi following. (c) Is either equilibrium in parts (a) and (b) better from the joint per- spective of Coke and Pepsi? How could the two rms do better? CH6 U7. Return to the game among the three lions in the Roman Colosseum in Exercise 88 in Chapter 3. A slave has just been thrown to the lions in the Roman Colosseum. Three lions are chained down in a line, with Lion 1 closest to the slave. Each lion's chain is short enough that he can only reach the two players imme- diately adjacent to him. The game proceeds as follows. First, Lion 1 decides whether or not to eat the slave. If Lion 1 has eaten the slave, then Lion 2 decides whether or not to eat Lion 1 (who is then too heavy to defend himself). If Lion 1 has not eaten the slave, then Lion 2 has no choice: he cannot try to eat Lion 1, because a ght would kill both lions. Similarly, if Lion 2 has eaten Lion 1, then Lion 3 decides whether or not to eat Lion 2. Each lion's preferences are fairly natural: best (4) is to eat and stay alive, next best (3) is to stay alive but go hungry, next (2) is to eat and be eaten, and worst (1) is to go hungry and be eaten. (a) Write out this game in strategic form. Make Lion 1 the row player, Lion 2 the column player, and Lion 3 the page player. (b) Find the Nash equilibria for the game. How many did you nd? (c) You should have found Nash equilibria that are not subgame-perfect. For each of those equilibria, which lion is making a noncredible threat? Explain