Both a home buyer (A) and seller (B) of a house agree on a price of 2.5 million dollars. A values the house at 3 million dollars and B values the house at 2 million dollars. Before the date of delivery of the keys, C offers to buy this house from B for 3 million dollars because C values the house at 4 million. (a) (5 marks) Assuming transaction costs are zero (0), fully explain what actions A, B, and C will take and how social surplus will be distributed among them if A has the remedy of expectation damages against B. (b) (5 marks) Assuming transaction costs are zero (O), fully explain what actions A, B, and C will take and how social surplus will be distributed among them if A has the remedy of specific performance against B. (c) (5 marks) Assuming transaction costs are zero (0), fully explain what actions A, B, and C will take and how social surplus will be distributed among them if A has no remedy against B. (d) (5 marks) How high can transaction costs be before it matters which remedy A has