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Case supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York. Jennifer Cleland, Appellant, v. Christian Thiron, Respondent, et al., Defendant. 268 A.D.2d 842, 704 N.Y.S.2d 316, 2000 N.Y. Slip Op. 00477 Jan. 20, 2000.... Plaintiff and defendant Christian Thirion (hereinafter defendant) were lovers for slightly less than three years, beginning in mid-1993. During that period, they resided together in plaintiff's residence. When the relationship commenced, defendant was already established as an artisan glassblower, doing business under the trade name of Glassart, and had recently purchased a building which he intended to convert into a studio and personal living quarters. It is undisputed that during the parties' relationship, plaintiff accompanied defendant to craft shows, assisted with various tasks, installed a computer system in the studio and paid various expenses of the business. In August 1994, plaintiff drafted and the parties executed a one-page document (hereinafter the agreement) which, by its terms, was intended to establish the parties' "financial and personal relationship ... for the purpose of reducing [plain-tiff's] personal financial liability for debts incrued [sic] in her name in the course of the construction of [the studio]." The agreement identified three revolving credit accounts that had been established in plaintiff's name, which "have been and will continue to be used exclusively for expenses related to the construction and establishment of [the studio], and for operating expenses associated with the Glassart business," and provided that "[i]n the event of [defendant's] death or disability ... the assets of the Glassart business ... should be used to pay the debts which exist in these accounts, as well as to pay [a $6,000 loan to defendant from plaintiff's parents]." Finally, and of primary interest here, the agreement provided: This document is also to acknowledge that [defendant is] separated from his wife ... and that he and [plaintiff] have been living as domestic partners since August of 1993. [Defendant and plaintiff] have also agreed to become partners in the Glassart company business (emphasis supplied). Plaintiff commenced this action in May 1997, seeking a declaration that the agreement "constitutes a partnership agreement for ownership and operation of [the Glassart business]" (second cause of action), damages for breach of the agreement (first cause of action), an accounting of the profits, losses and assets of Glassart from April1, 1993 (third cause of action), and imposition of a constructive trust upon the assets of Glassart and its real property and payment to plaintiff of not less than $60,000 therefrom (fourth cause of action).... Supreme Court found that the parties never entered into a partnership, that to the extent that the agreement might be viewed as contemplating the parties' future partnership it was unenforceable due to the absence of any material terms.... Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. First, we agree with the Supreme Court's conclusion that no partnership existed as a matter of law. "Among the factors to be considered in determining whether a partnership was created are the intent of the parties (express or implied), whether there was joint control and management of the business, whether there was a sharing of the profits as well as a sharing of the losses, and whether there was a combination of property, skill or knowledge"... the evidence adduced on the summary judgment motion fails to raise a genuine question of fact concerning the existence of any of those factors. The record establishes that the studio property was owned solely by defendant and that plaintiff made no contribution to its purchase and neither made nor assumed responsibility for the mortgage payments thereon. Further, it is undisputed that plaintiff's name was never placed on a certificate of doing business as partners, no partnership tax returns were ever filed and there never was any sharing of profits or losses. Although there is no question that plaintiff made some financial contributions to defendant's business, both the agreement and plaintiff herself would characterize those contributions as loans, the very antithesis of a partnership relationship. Similarly, although plaintiff apparently performed some services for the business, by seeking compensation in the form of wages she would portray herself as a mere employee. In sum, our review of the record reveals not a scintilla of evidence supporting plaintiff's claim of the existence of a partnership Plaintiff's remaining contentions have been considered and found to be also unavailing