C D Consider the following static Prisoner's Dilemma game. C D 2, 2 -5, 5 5, -5 0,0 For the following parts, suppose this game is played for infinitely many times with discount factor for both players & [0, 1). Suppose d = 0. What is the maximum equilibrium payoff that player 1 can get in the first period in a SPNE of this game? Suppose d = 1 for the first three rounds, and 6 = 0 for every following round. What is the maximum equilibrium payoff that player 1 can get in the first three combined periods in a SPNE of this game? Now we switch back to some generic value for d in an infinite game. Let both players adopt the following grim trigger strategy: start with cooperation; cooperate as long as no one has ever defected before; otherwise defect. What is the condition on d for this strategy profile to be a SPNE?