(c) Determine the players' expected payoffs in the part-(a) and part-(b) equilibria. Now suppose the game is played sequentially, with Teen 1 moving first and committing to their action (Swerve or Stay) by throwing away the steering wheel. (d) Draw the extensive form for this version of the game. (e) Use backward induction to determine the subgame-perfect equilibrium. For extra credit: (f) Determine the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in terms of Teen 1's strategy and Teen 2's contingent strategies.5. "Chicken" is a game played by two teenagers who drive their cars toward one another at top speed on a single-lane road. The first to Swerve off the road loses face, whereas the one who Stays the course gains peer-group esteem. If both Swerve, both lose face, but each to a lesser extent than if they did so alone; if both Stay, both die in the resulting head-on collision. The numerical payoffs for the Chicken game are given in the following table: Teen 2 Swerve Stay Teen Swerve 2, 2 1 , 3 1 Stay 3, 1 0,0 (a) Determine the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (if any). (b) Determine the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. What is the probability that both teenagers will survive