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(Can Knowledge Systems Help Boeing Trounce Airbus? CASE STUDY) From this case study please apply the Decision tree algorithm by calculating Entropy, Information gain and
(Can Knowledge Systems Help Boeing Trounce Airbus? CASE STUDY)
From this case study please apply the Decision tree algorithm by calculating Entropy, Information gain and Gini index. Answer should have the final decision tree, an explanation of each split and conclusion.
please the answer should be for this case study only PLEASE!!!!!!!
1 Part Three Key Syobin Applications for the Disital Age Can Knowledge Systems Help Boeing Trounce Airbus? CASE STUDY It is now in a head-to-head struggle with Arbus for full-time work wo complete. For every customization this position. choice on every airplane bulit, bundreds of pages of Alrbus is 80 percent owned by Eumpean detailed drawings needed to be drawn manually. Aeroenatic Defence \&r Spane Co. (EADS) and 20 per- To reuse old paper aircraft configurations and cent by the United KIngdoen's BAE Systems and parts designs, the engineers first needed to seanch receives subsidiand loans from European govern- through an immerse number of paper drawings wo ments. In 19n6, Airbus decided to challenge Boeing find appeoprlate designs to reuse for the specific. for the jumbo jet market. Airbus management pre- configuration. They then laboriously copied the old dicrs air travel will expand rapidly, requiring many designs to use for the new plane. Inevitably, errors glant jumbo jets to carry the increased mase of pas- crept into the new designs-large numbers of errors, sengers without hiking up operational casts. It envi-_ given the large numbers of deslgn shersi-because of sions a hub-and-spoike model of alr travel where anavoidable copying mistakes. jumbo jets transport passengers to a small nurver of It used to take soo computers to manage the hub dities, from which passengers transfer bo smaller coordination of engineering and mamutacturing and connecting flights to their ultimate destinations. many of these did not communicabe directly with Boeing management has a very difterent vision. Sach ocher. The list of parts produced by engineering It believes that most travelers prefer to fly from their for a given airplane was onefligured differently from own city noestop to their destination, foe examples the lists used by manufacruring and customer Detmoit to Shanghal nather than Detroit to Tokyo-wo service. Ulimately, the parts list had wo be broken Shanghai. Such flights do not need jumbo jets. It tore- down, converted, and recoraputed up to 13 times sees a turn bo smaller airliners that will fly quickly during the production of a simgle plane and inexpensively, enabling passengers to dly Anocher problem with manual deslign was that the nonstop from departure to destination, bypassing the staff needed to create life-sias mock-ups in plywood overcrowded hubs. All in all, Boeling foresers a strong and plastic to ersure that everything fit and that the expansion of smaller jet sales rather than of jumbo pipes and wires that run through the plane are jet sales. Both companies' business and product placed properly and do not interfere with other development strategies are based on these differing necessary equipment. They were also needed to visions. verify the accumacy of part specificarions. Building. In addition to Airbus competition, Boeing faced mock-ups was a slow, expensive, laborious peocess. difficult condirions becalses the market for At peoduction time, erross would again oocur when commercial alrplanes has been shrinking due to part mambers of specifications were manually oppied alrline mergers and the downturn in alr travel after and at times miscopied onto onder sheets, resulting the September 11,2001 , terrorist attacks. The in many wrong or mis-sized parts arriving. company moved its global headquarters from Seattle Emgineers worked in separate fiefiloms based on to Chicago to focus on newer businesses hased on their field of speciallaation. Some engineers designed intormation and communications technologies. the plane's parts, others asesembled them, and ochers Boeing's management has been trying to lower designed the parts' packing crates. They rarely costs by wsing technology to reform inefticient conpared notes. If production engineers discovered business processes. Boeing's alrplane production a part that didn't fit, they sent a complaint back to process used to be highly paper-intensive, with a the designers located in another plant. The designers final design of the Boeing 747 consisting of then pulled out their drawings, reconfigured the part Chapter 11 Managing Knswhedase 2 to make it match drawings of the surrounding parts highly integrated, a small change in one area ripples and sent the new design back to the plant. throughout the design. In July 2006, Airbus Warehouses were filled with paper. announced another six-month delay in A380 In the early 1980s, Boeing began switching to a deliveries, aggain because of wiring peoblems. "paperless deslgn" model which it weed to Inability to easlly solve these problems caused computerise the design and peoducrion of irs 777 Airbus to announce further delays the following alrcraft. The 777 alrcraft carries 300 to 440 Sepcember. At that time, EADS said it was boo early passengers and lowers operating, maintenance, and to say bow long the latest delivery delay would last fuel costs because it uses lighter materials and can or how much it would ost. fly wirh only two pilots and two engines. The Boeing, in the meantime, innovated again with lits "paperles design" system employs Dassault Systems' 787 "Dreamliner." The 787 is designed to carry 200 wo CATIA computer-alded design software, nine IRM 300 people on routes from North America to Europe maintrames, a Cray supencomputer, and 2,200 work-_ and Asia. Boeing designed this plane to fly long stations, sworing 3500 billion bits of information. It distances economically while keeping passengers enabled engineers to call up any of the 777's millions corsfortable and econoenking on thel. About half of of parss, modify them, fit them into the surrounding. Each plane will be made trom carbon-fiber corsposite strucrure, and put them back into the plane's telec-_ materlals, which are lighter than aluminum and can tronk box" so that ocher engineers can make their be buitt in larger sections. The 787 ofters more cabin own adjustments. pressure, humidiry, headmom, and window space Boeing assembled a single parts list that can be: than comparable commercial planes. Its engines use used by every division without modification. In about 20 percent less fuel per mile than similarlyaddition, management esteblished design-pendoction sized twin-engine planes. One version of the 787 is teams that brought together deslgners and fabricabors capable of flying 8,300 nautical miles, long enough to from a range of speclatries throughout the whole fly nonstop from New Yoek to Homg Kong. Boeing. process. Ulrimately, the alrplane was deslgned only took 4.5 years to bring the 787 to market, 16 bo entirely on the computer screen and was initially 18 momtho faster than most other models, and the assembled without expensive mock-upe. The 787 will enter servioe in 2008. company cut overall engineering design errors by 50 Bocing's 787 made all Airbus models an the market percent while designing and bullding a 777 in 10 boak oundated. To onemebe with the 787 , Airbus, In months. the summer of 2004 , offered the A350, a midsine Although Boeling's 777 was a marketplace hir, plane foe carrying 250 to 375 passengers that la basiArbus continued wo take marker share trom Boeing. - cally a retooled version of its older A330 model. So far The 9/11 tersorist attacks depressed demand for air it has had liede success, with a number of alrlines travel, and Boeing's profits dropped 30 percent stating that the A3s0's operating econoenies and coenberween 2001 and 2002 in 2002 , Beeling's military fort did not maoch those of the 787. divisina surpassed lis consmencial aviation division For Boeling, the 787 bs a daring experiment in revenue, desplite Bocing's historic devotion to because it is using a new peoduction peocess. Instead alrcraft development. In 2003, for the first time in of being produced under one roof, the 787 is being hiswory, Airbus delivered moee planes than Boeing. built in a modular assembly process. Boeing farmed Boeing's market share had planged from nearly 70 out design and oonstruction of about 80 percent of percent in 1995 to roughly 50 percent and the com-_ the aircraft to hundreds of other companies, many pany had to cut 60,000 employees. outside the United States. Mirsubishi is in charge of Slince then, Boeing has been on the rebound. The wings, while Messier-Dowty of France is making Arbus stumbled in its launch of lis giant A390 jumbo the landing gear. Forelgn suppliers have freedom bo jet, which has two decks and is capable of flying 550 design the components, reducing Boeing's product passengers. The A350 completed a sucnessful development costs. maiden flight in A peil 2005 , but Alrbus announced Boeing and irs key suppliers are using sottware that deliveries would be six moeths late due to that lets designers around the world electronically complexiry wiring the aircraft for sophisticated collabocate in designing components and manufaccustom equipment such as in-flight emtertainment turing peocesses. Dassault Systems added features to and communications units requested by some Its planning and deslgn sottware to cope with alrlines. Since the A3 BO's electronic systems are Boeing's global supply chain. Boeling expanded its use of Dassuult's version 5 Product Life Cycle Boeing has done. While Boeing started making the Management software trom 1,000 to 6,000 linenses. Swltch 10 years ago, Airbus was focused on merging This software suite includes CKTL design software, its operations into a single company trom its orlginal Enovia, a tool for managing deslgn data, and Delmia, structuse as a diffuse consoetium. Acconding to which slmulates assembly and manufacturing _ Arbus Chairman Christlian Streiff, "It will take about processes. These software tools enable deslgners to 10 years for us to get hack to the level of Boeling in use a single set of data and to simulate digitally the terms of development and efficiency." plane's life cycle from design through productinn, The 787 has been central to Boeing's revival, quickly modeling iteratioes in design to reduce racking up 350 orders in two years. It forced Airbus erroes and redundant work. CATIA V5 sottware onto the defensive and to rethink its big plane makes is possible for Boeling's suppliers and Strategy. Boeing calls the 787 irs "game changer." Any subcontractors to have a higger role in deslgning and major problems with the 787 would not only jeopardeveloping the new jet. Boeing wants this technology dixe sales, but Boeing's crealibitity and leading poskto cut both recurring and non-tecurring design and tion in the passenger aiscraft market. manufacturing costs in half compared with the 777 . Saurter Lalle Warns, "llowing lhos the Houm m. ltw 207 Outsourcing the 787 required Dassault to imperove Dramliner" The New lirk Tiese, Mry 7 , 2ros Daniel Mblaels 3-D master file bo serve as a single source for digital and Mawn Curain, "EADS Sos Yeans of Wark Ahead bepair carbon-fiber corrososise material. Ascrucialdeadlinesloomed,BoeingengineersSnarJamal,Sepormber25,200g1.LynnLunatiodandDanbll"KithusOpensOwrtualbyLoskingatProcament,"TheWail production pobblems that could threaten delivery of Noumal, June is, 2006 and "Atrer Feur Yhars in the Rear, lloeing is the 787 in 2005 . The fuselage section failed in company testing, forcing Boeing w make more satety. The overall weight of the plane was too high, especially the carbon-fiber wing. Suppliers struggled to meet Boeing's technical standards and ambirious production deadilines. Boeing would not ancepe the first two nose sections. Software peograms designed by a variety of vendoes had trouble "talking" wo one another. Arbus has also run into additional snags. In July 2006, Airbus announced further design changes to the A350 to widen its cahin and windows and provide adjustable cebin humidity. But it won't enter servine until 2012, four years after the 787. Airbus's problems wirh its A380 jumbo jet made if noore difficult to make the design changes to the A350 required to match Boeing. Airbus also announced a long-term overhaul of its operations. Th turther cut costs, boost efficiency, and improve planning, Nrbus needs to involve its suppeliers mare in the design process asStep by Step Solution
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