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U.S. Supreme Court

Smith v. Jones

William Smith filed his suit in California State Superior Court against Robert Jones, setting forth the several acts of the California State Legislature thereof, enacted for the purpose of securing to William Smith the exclusive navigation of all the waters within the state of California, with boats moved by fire or steam, for a term of years which has not yet expired. Jones, the defendant, was in possession of two steamboats which were employed in running along the Sacramento River, in violation of the exclusive privilege conferred on Smith. Jones stated that the boats employed by him were duly enrolled and licensed to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade under the Act of Congress, entitled, "An act for enrolling and licensing ships and vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating the same." And Jones insisted on his right, in virtue of such licenses, to navigate the waters of the Sacramento River to the contrary notwithstanding. At the hearing, the California State Superior Court found for Smith, being of the opinion that the California laws were not repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and were valid. This decree was affirmed in the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court, and it was thereupon brought to this US Supreme Court by appeal.

The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the US Supreme Court:

The State of California maintains the constitutionality of its state laws. California states it is sovereign, completely independent, and connected with other states only by a league. This is true. But, when these allied sovereigns converted their league into a government, when they converted their league into a nation, the whole character of the states underwent a change, the extent of which must be determined by a fair consideration of the Constitution as the instrument by which that change was effected.

The Constitution contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. The words are, "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."

The subject to be regulated is commerce, and our Constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word. Smith would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends navigation.

If commerce does not include navigation, the federal government has no direct power over that subject, and can make no law prescribing what shall constitute American vessels or requiring that they shall be navigated by American seamen. Yet this power has been exercised from the commencement of our government, has been exercised with the consent of all, and has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation. All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word "commerce" to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the Constitution was framed.

The word used in the Constitution, then, comprehends, and has been always understood to comprehend, navigation within its meaning, and a power to regulate navigation is as expressly granted as if that term had been added to the word "commerce."

To what commerce does this power extend? The Constitution informs us, to commerce "with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." It has, we believe, been universally admitted that these words comprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and any other to which this power does not extend. It has been truly said that "commerce," as the word is used in the Constitution, is a unit every part of which is indicated by the term.

The subject to which the power is next applied is to commerce "among the several States." The word "among" means intermingled with. A thing which is among others is intermingled with them. Commerce among the states cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state, but may be introduced into the interior.

The power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several states. It would be a very useless power if it could not pass those lines. The commerce of the United States is that of the whole United States. Every district has a right to participate in it. The deep streams which penetrate our country in every direction pass through the interior of almost every state in the Union, and furnish the means of exercising this right. If Congress has the power to regulate it, that power must be exercised whenever the subject exists. If it exists within the states, then the power of Congress may be exercised within a state.

We are now arrived at the inquiry -- What is this power?

It is the power to regulate, that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution.The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation, within the limits of every state in the Union, so far as that navigation may be in any manner connected with "commerce with foreign nations, or among the several states, or with the Indian tribes." It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of California and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under consideration applies.

Smith urges with great earnestness that, although the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states be coextensive with the subject itself, and have no other limits than are prescribed in the Constitution, yet the states may severally exercise the same power, within their respective jurisdictions. In support of this argument, it is said that states possessed it as an inseparable attribute of sovereignty, before the formation of the Constitution, and still retain it except so far as they have surrendered it by that instrument; that this principle results from the nature of the government, and is secured by the tenth amendment; that an affirmative grant of power is not exclusive unless in its own nature it be such that the continued exercise of it by the former possessor is inconsistent with the grant, and that this is not of that description.

But, when a state proceeds to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the several states, it is exercising the very power that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do.

Since, however, in exercising the power of regulating their own purely internal affairs, whether of trading or police, the states may sometimes enact laws the validity of which depends on their interfering with, and being contrary to, an act of Congress passed in pursuance of the Constitution, the Court will enter upon the inquiry whether the laws of California, as expounded by the highest tribunal of that state, have, in their application to this case, come into collision with an act of Congress and deprived a citizen of a right to which that act entitles him. Should this collision exist, it will be immaterial whether those laws were passed in virtue of a concurrent power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states" or in virtue of a power to regulate their domestic trade and police. In one case and the other, the acts of California must yield to the law of Congress, and the decision sustaining the privilege they confer against a right given by a law of the Union must be erroneous.

The nullity of any act inconsistent with the Constitution is produced by the declaration that the Constitution is the supreme law. In every such case, the act of Congress or the treaty is supreme, and the law of the state, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.

DECREE. On consideration whereof, this Court is of opinion that the several licenses to the steamboats to carry on the coasting trade, which are set up by Jones, which were granted under an act of Congress, passed in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, gave full authority to those vessels to navigate the waters of the United States, by steam or otherwise, for the purpose of carrying on the coasting trade, any law of the State of California to the contrary notwithstanding, and that so much of the several laws of the State of California as prohibits vessels, licensed according to the laws of the United States, from navigating the waters of the State of California by means of fire or steam is repugnant to the said Constitution, and void. This Court is therefore of opinion that the decree of the California Court of Appeal affirming the decree of the California State Superior Court, which ruled for Smith, is erroneous, and ought to be reversed, and the same is hereby reversed and annulled, and this Court doth further DIRECT, ORDER, and DECREE that the lawsuit of said Smith be dismissed, and the same is hereby dismissed accordingly.