Case Brief: PEOPLE v. RYAN. Use the provided format. Be detailed. Answer questions 2 -6 .

CASE BRIEFING FORMAT PROF. DOBSON CASE NAME, COURT & YEAR FACTS: crime(s) facts leading to alleged criminal act; facts behind any defense PROCEDURAL POSTURE procedurally what happened in each lower court & why (if given) track procedurally how case went through court system to get to the court where the opinion is from ISSUES (PHRASE THESE AS QUESTIONS!) RESULT (DECISION; JUDGMENT): How did the Court procedurally dispose of the case? HOLDING: What rule(s) of law did the Court's decision announce? REASONING: Reconstruct the reasoning process step-by-step that led the Court to its Holding and Result CONCURRENCES (IF ANY) DISSENTS (IF ANY) ALL BRIEFS MUST BE DONE ON HARD COPY; READY TO TURN IN READ THE FOOTNOTES! USE BULLET POINTS IN DOING YOUR BRIEF BE OVER-INCLUSIVE RATHER THAN UNDER-INCLUSIVE! PEOPLE v. RYAN Court of Appeals of New York 82 N.Y.2d 497, 626 N.E.2d 51 (1993) KaYE, CHier JupGe: Penal Law 220.18(5) makes it a felony to \"knowingly and unlawfully possess ... six hundred twenty-five milligrams of a hallucinogen.\" The question of statutory interpretation before us is whether \"knowingly\" applies to the weight of the controlled substance. We conclude that it does and that the trial evidence was insufficient to satisfy that mental culpability element . . . . Viewed in a light most favorable to the People, the evidence revealed that on October 2, 1990, defendant asked his friend David Hopkins to order and receive a shipment of hallucinogenic mushrooms on his behalf. Hopkins agreed, and adhering to defendant's instructions placed a call to their mutual friend Scott ... and requested the \"usual shipment.\" Tipped off to the transaction, ... [an] investigator ... located the package ... then borrowed a Federal Express uniform and van and delivered the package to Hopkins, the addressee, who was arrested upon signing for it. Hopkins explained that the package was for defendant and agreed to participate in a supervised delivery to him. In a telephone call recorded by the police, Hopkins notified defendant that he got the package, reporting a \"shit load of mushrooms in there.\" Defendant responded, \"I know, don't say nothing.\" At another point Hopkins referred to the shipment containing two pounds. The men agreed to meet . . .. At the meeting, after a brief conversation, Hopkins handed defendant a substitute package . ... Moments after taking possession, defendant was arrested. He was later indicted for attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree . . . . The case proceeded to trial, where the evidence summarized above was adduced. Additionally, the police chemist testified that the total weight of the mushrooms in Hopkins' package was 932.8 grams (about two pounds), and that a 140 gram sample of the package contents contained 796 milligrams of psilocybin, a hallucinogen . . . . [No] evidence [was offered] as to how much psilocybin would typically appear in two pounds of mushrooms. At the close of the People's case, defendant moved to dismiss for insufficient proof that he knew the level of psilocybin in the mushrooms. ... [The motion] denied, defendant was convicted as charged . . . . The Appellate Division affirmed. The court held that a defendant must know the nature of the substance possessed, and acknowledged that the weight of the controlled substance is an element of the crime . . .. [HJowever, ... the court held that \"the term 'knowingly' should be construed to refer only to the element of possession and not the weight requirement.\" ... We now reverse. Although the present case involves an attempt, analysis begins with the elements of the completed crime, second degree criminal possession of a controlled substance. Penal Law 220.18(5) provides: A person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses: .. . 5. six hundred twenty-five milligrams of a hallucinogen. ... Atissue is whether defendant must ... know the weight of the material possessed. That is a question of statutory interpretation, as to which the Court's role is clear: our purpose is not to pass on the wisdom of the statute or any of its requirements, but rather to implement the will of the Legislature . . . . In effectuating legislative intent, we look first of course to the statutory language. Read in context, it seems evident that \"knowingly\" does apply to the weight element. Indeed, given that a defendant's awareness must extend not only to the fact of possessing something (\"knowingly ... possesses\") but also to the nature of the material possessed (\"knowingly ... possesses ... a hallucinogen\"), any other reading would be strained. Inasmuch as the knowledge requirement carries through to the end of the sentence ... , eliminating it from the intervening element weight would rob the statute of its obvious meaning. We conclude, therefore, that there is a mens rea element associated with the weight of the drug. That reading is fortified by two rules of construction ordained by the Legislature itself. First, a \"statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose . R I S IR strict liability, should be construed as defining a crime of mental culpability\" (Penal Law 15.15[2]). If any material element of an offense lacks a mens rea requirement, it is a strict liability crime (Penal Law 15.10). Conversely, a crime is one of \"mental culpability\" only when a mental state \"is required with respect to every material element of an offense\" (id.). By ruling that a defendant need not have knowledge of the weight, the Appellate Division in effect held, to that extent, that second degree criminal possession is a strict liability crime. That is an erroneous statutory construction unless a legislative intent to achieve that result is \"clearly indicated.\" In a similar vein, the Legislature has provided in Penal Law 15.15(1): Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements. 1. When the commission of an offense defined in this chapter, or some element of an offense, requires a particular culpable mental state, such mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense by use of the terms \"intentionally,\" \"knowingly,\" \"recklessly\" or \"criminal negligence,\" or by use of terms, such as \"with intent to defraud\" and \"knowing it to be false,\" describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge. When one and only one of such terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.\" . .. Accordingly, if a single mens rea is set forth, as here, it presumptively applies to all elements of the offense unless a contrary legislative intent is plain. We discern no \"clear\" legislative intent to make the weight of a drug a strict liability element, as is required before we can construe the statute in that manner. Moreover, the overall structure of the drug possession laws supports the view that a defendant must have some knowledge of the weight. There are six degrees of criminal possession of a controlled substance, graded in severity from a class A misdemeanor up to an A-l felony. The definition of each begins identically: \"A person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the ... degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses.... \" The primary distinctions between one grade or another relate to the type and weight of the controlled substance . . . . To ascribe to the Legislature an intent to mete out drastic differences in punishment without a basis in culpability would be inconsistent with notions of individual responsibility and proportionality prevailing in the Penal Law . . . . The People's contrary argument is based in part on a concern that it would be \"prohibitively difficult,\" if not impossible, to secure convictions if they were required to prove that a defendant had knowledge of the weight. We disagree. Often there will be evidence from which the requisite knowledge may be deduced, such as negotiations concerning weight, potency or price. Similarly, for controlled substances measured on an \"aggregate weight\" basis. Knowledge of the weight may be inferred from defendant's handling of the material, because the weight of the entire mixture, including cutting agents, is counted . . . . By contrast, that same inference may be unavailable for controlled substances measured by \"pure\" weight, like psilocybin ... [that] are customarily combined [or found] with other substances. ... Although we cannot simply read the knowledge requirement out of the statute, these \"compelling practical considerations\" may inform our interpretation of that element . . . . . A purpose of the knowledge requirement, ... is to avoid over-penalizing someone who unwittingly possesses a larger amount of a controlled substance than anticipated. That legislative purpose can be satisfied, among other ways, with evidence that the pure weight of the controlled substance possessed by defendant is typical for the particular form in which the drug appears. This correlation between the pure weight typically found, and the pure weight actually possessed, substantially reduces the possibility that a person will unjustly be convicted for a more serious crime.. . .. v With the foregoing principles in mind, we consider whether there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of attempted second degree possession, an A-1l felony. Certainly there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant attempted and intended to possess a two-pound box of hallucinogenic mushrooms. It is also undisputed that, upon testing, the mushrooms in the particular box defendant attempted to possess ... contained more than 650 milligrams of psilocybin . . . . Although in these circumstances defendant could properly be convicted of attempting to possess the amount of psilocybin that would typically appear in two pounds of hallucinogenic mushrooms, there was no evidence linking psilocybin weight to mushroom weight . . . . We thus conclude on this record that there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the knowledge requirement within the meaning of the statute . . . . 2. Default culpability. The New York statutory provision defining the drug offense was ambiguous as to whether the culpability term \"knowingly\" applied to possession only, or also to the amount possessed. The court resolved this ambiguity by invoking two statutory default rules: New York Penal Law 15.15(2) (McKinney 2016), which disfavors strict liability with respect to any element absent clear legislative intent, and 15.15(1), which distributes any culpability term specified in the offense definition to every element, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary. These default rules parallel Model Penal Code 2.02(1) and 2.02(4). Section 2.02(1) provides that \"a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently ... with respect to each material element of the offense\" unless one of two exceptions occurs, which are specified in 2.05: Either the offense is a mere \"violation,\" not punishable by incarceration, or \"a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof plainly 32 appears. Section 2.02(4) provides: Prescribed culpability requirement applies to all material elements. When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears. Suppose the New York Penal Law had a provision like 2.02(1), barring strict liability, but did not have a \"distributive default rule\" paralleling 2.02(4). What level of culpability would then be required with respect to the weight of the drug? What result would be reached in Ryan? 3. The legislative response to Ryan. Provoked by the Ryan decision, the New York legislature rewrote NYPL 220.18 (McKinney 2016) to read: A person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree when he or she knowingly and unlawfully possesses . .. (5) a hallucinogen and said hallucinogen weighs six hundred twenty five milligrams or more. And if this section is not clear enough in overruling Ryan, the legislature also added this in NYPL 15.20: Notwithstanding the use of the term \"knowingly\" in any provision of this chapter defining an offense in which the aggregate weight of a controlled substance or marihuana is an element, knowledge by the defendant of the aggregate weight of such controlled substance or marihuana is not an element of any such offense and it is not, unless expressly so provided, a defense to a prosecution therefor that the defendant did not know the aggregate weight of the controlled substance or marihuana. Is 220.18 now a crime of strict liability with respect to the weight of the drug, or one of negligence? 4. Law and grammar. The Ryan decision takes pains to note that a defendant's awareness must extend not only to the fact of possessing something (\"knowingly . .. possesses\") but also to the nature of the material possessed (\"knowingly ... possesses ... a hallucinogen\"). In that light, consider Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009). A federal law, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1) (2016), forbids \"[a]ggravated identity theft\" and imposes a mandatory two-year prison term on any individual convicted of certain predicate crimes. Aggravated identify theft occurs when, during the commission of a predicate crime, a defendant \"knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.\" Flores-Figueroa, a Mexican citizen, gave his employer counterfeit alien registration and Social Security cards in order to secure employment. The documents contained his own name but the identification numbers of other individuals. At trial, Flores sought acquittal of the identify theft charge, maintaining that the government could not prove that he \"knew\" that the falsified documents' numbers belonged to someone else. The District Court sided with the government, holding that \"knowingly\" in 1028A(a)(1) did not apply to \"of another person.\" Flores was convicted and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that the government must show that the defendant knew that the means of identification belonged to another person and were not simply a random group of numbers. Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, explained that \"courts ordinarily read a phrase in a criminal statute that introduces the elements of a crime with the word 'knowingly' as applying that word to each element,\" not the first few. \"In ordinary English, where a transitive verb has an object, listeners in most contexts assume that an adverb (such as knowingly) that modifies the transitive verb tells the listener how the subject performed the entire action including the object as set forth in the sentence.\" 5. The recklessness default rule. The Rhode Island Supreme Court invoked yet another Model Penal Code default rule in determining the mental element of a child abuse offense in State v. Lima, 546 A.2d 770 (R.l. 1988): The defendant ... was convicted of first-degree child abuse for allegedly lowering the victim, a two-and-a-half-year-old boy, into a tub of scalding water. Lima completed five years of schooling in her native Portugal. She served as a babysitter for nine children, including the victim . . . . . The trial justice committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury that an intentional act is required to convict under ... the child-abuse statute. Counsel for defendant requested an instruction that \"in order to find the Defendant guilty of child abuse you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant intentionally burned the child in hot water.\" As a general proposition, where the requisite intent is not defined in a statute establishing a criminal offense such intent should be explicated in an instruction . . . . Our review of the record, and most specifically the charge as given, indicates that the jury may have convicted defendant because she injured the child by placing him in the water, without finding that she inflicted the injury intentionally. As a result, there must be a new trial. We note that a number of states apply a standard similar to that set forth in the Model Penal Code, 2.02(3), in situations in which the requisite level of intent is not set forth within the statutory scheme in question. The code provides that \"[wlhen the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.\" We deem such standard to be appropriate in the instant matter. Thus, upon retrial we direct the trial justice to instruct the jury in accordance with the standard set forth above. See State v. Adams, 404 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Oh. 1980) (requiring only a showing of recklessness in an \"endangering children\" statute). We view such an instruction as protecting a defendant from a conviction predicated upon an act devoid of mens rea while at the same time protecting a class of defenseless victims from physical abuse. [546 A.2d at 771-72.] Note that Lima relies on Model Penal Code 2.02(3), which establishes recklessness as the default level of culpability. The New York Penal Law applied in Ryan lacks this recklessness default rule. The court found that knowledge of the weight possessed was required only because \"knowledge\" governed the weight element, and so had to be \"distributed\" to the weight element. But what culpability would the Ryan court have required with respect to possession and the weight possessed if no culpability term had appeared in the statute? Was this level of culpability established by the evidence? What result would be reached in the Ryan case if no culpability term appeared in the drug statute, but New York had a \"recklessness default rule,\" like the MPC's 2.02(3)? 6. Without the \"recklessness default rule\" of 2.02(3), the Model Penal Code would still have a default culpability standard: negligence, the minimal level of culpability requirec for criminal liability by 2.02(1). Why, then, is 2.02(3) necessary? Should negligence suffice for default culpability under the Code? The Commentary to 2.02(3) explains the policy behind the default culpability provision: Subsection (3) provides that unless the kind of culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense has been prescribed by law, it is established if a person acted purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto. This accepts as the basic norm what usually is regarded as the common law position. More importantly, it represents the most convenient norm for drafting purposes. When purpose or knowledge is to be required it is conventional to be explicit. And since negligence is an exceptional basis of liability, it should be excluded . .. unless explicitly prescribed.3