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Case Brief: REGINA v. PRINCE. Use the provided format. Be detailed. Answer questions 1-7. CASE BRIEFING FORMAT PROF. DOBSON CASE NAME, COURT & YEAR FACTS:

Case Brief: REGINA v. PRINCE. Use the provided format. Be detailed. Answer questions 1-7.

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CASE BRIEFING FORMAT PROF. DOBSON CASE NAME, COURT & YEAR FACTS: crime(s) facts leading to alleged criminal act; facts behind any defense PROCEDURAL POSTURE procedurally what happened in each lower court & why (if given) track procedurally how case went through court system to get to the court where the opinion is from ISSUES (PHRASE THESE AS QUESTIONS!) RESULT (DECISION; JUDGMENT): How did the Court procedurally dispose of the case? HOLDING: What rule(s) of law did the Court's decision announce? REASONING: Reconstruct the reasoning process step-by-step that led the Court to its Holding and Result CONCURRENCES (IF ANY) DISSENTS (IF ANY) ALL BRIEFS MUST BE DONE ON HARD COPY; READY TO TURN IN READ THE FOOTNOTES! USE BULLET POINTS IN DOING YOUR BRIEF BE OVER-INCLUSIVE RATHER THAN UNDER-INCLUSIVE! REGINA v. PRINCE Court for Crown Cases Reserved L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875) Case stated by DenmvaNn, J. At the assizes for Surrey, held at Kingston-upon-Thames, on the 24th of March last, Henry Prince was tried upon the charge of having unlawfully taken one Annie Phillips, an unmarried girl, being under the age of sixteen years, out of the possession and against the will of her father. The indictment was framed under s.55 of 24 & 25 Vict. .100.%0 He was found guilty. All the facts necessary to support a conviction existed, unless the following facts constituted a defence. The girl Annie Phillips, though proved by her father to be fourteen years old on the 6th of April following, looked very much older than sixteen, and the jury found upon reasonable evidence that before the defendant took her away she had told him that she was eighteen, and that the defendant bona fide believed that statement, and that such belief was reasonable. If the Court should be of the opinion that under these circumstances a conviction was right, the defendant was to appear for judgment at the next assizes for Surrey; otherwise the conviction was to be quashed . . . . June 26. The following judgments were delivered: The following judgment (in which Cocksurn, C.J., MELLOR, LusH, QuaIN, DENMAN, ARCHIBALD, FIELD, and LINDLEY, J.J., and PoLLock, B., concurred) was delivered by BLACKBURN, J.o.o.. The question, therefore, is reduced to this, whether the words in 24 & 25 Vict. .100, s.55, that whosoever shall take \"any unmarried girl, being under the age of sixteen, out of the possession of her father,\" are to be read as if they were \"being under the age of sixteen, and he knowing she was under that age.\" No such words are contained in the statute, nor is there the word \"maliciously,\" \"knowingly\" or any other word used that can be said to involve a similar meaning. The argument in favour of the prisoner must therefore entirely proceed on the ground that, in general, a guilty mind is an essential ingredient in a crime, and that where a statute creates a crime, the intention of the legislature should be presumed to be to include \"knowingly\" in the definition of the crime, and the statute should be read as if that word were inserted, unless the contrary intention appears. We need not inquire at present whether the canon of construction goes quite so far as above stated, for we are of opinion that the intention of the legislature sufficiently appears to have been to punish the abduction, unless the girl, in fact, was of such an age as to make her consent an excuse, irrespective of whether he knew her to be too young to give an effectual consent and to fix that age at sixteen. The section in question is one of a series of enactments beginning with s.48, and ending with s.55, forming a code for the protection of women, and the guardians of young women. These enactments are taken with scarcely any alteration from the repealed statute, 9 Geo. 4, .31, which had collected them into a code from a variety of old statutes all repealed by it. Section 50 enacts, that whosoever shall \"unlawfully and carnally know and abuse any girl under the age of ten years,\" shall be guilty of felony. Section 51, whoever shall \"unlawfully and carnally know and abuse any girl being above the age of ten years, and under the age of twelve years,\" shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. It seems impossible to suppose that the intention of the legislature in those two sections could have been to make the crime depend upon the knowledge of the prisoner of the girl's actual age. It would produce the monstrous result that a man who had carnal connection with a girl, in reality not quite ten years old, but whom he on reasonable grounds believed to be a litle more than ten, was to escape altogether. He could not, in that view of the statute, be convicted of the felony, for he did not know her to be under ten. He could not be convicted of the misdemeanor, because she was in fact not above the age of ten. It seems to us that the intention of the legislature was to punish those who had connection with young girls, though with their consent, unless the girl was in fact old enough to give valid consent. The man who has connection with a child, relying on her consent, does it at his peril, if she is below the statutable age . . .. The following judgment (in which KeLLy, C.B., CLEAsBY, PoLLock, and AMPHLETT, B.B., and Grove, Quain, and Denmvan, J.J., concurred) was delivered by BRAMWELL, B. ... [T]he question is whether he is guilty where he knows, as he thinks, that she is over sixteen. This introduces the necessity for reading the statute with some strange words introduced; as thus: \"Whosoever shall take any unmarried girl, being under the age of sixteen, and not believing her to be over the age of sixteen, out of the possession,\" etc. Those words are not there, and the question is, whether we are bound to construe the statute as though they were, on account of the rule that the mens rea is necessary to make an act a crime. | am of opinion that we are not, nor as though the word \"knowingly\" was there, and for the following reasons: The act forbidden is wrona in itself, if without lawful cause; | do not say illegal, but wrong. | have not lost sight of this, that though the statute probably principally aims at seduction for carnal purposes, ne 1aking may be by a female witn a good mouve. Nevertneless, altnougn nere may pe such cases, wnich are not Immoral In one sense, | say tnat tne act forbidden is wrong. Let us remember what is the case supposed by the statute. It supposes that there is a girl it does not say a woman, but a girl something between a child and a woman; it supposes she is in the possession of her father or mother, or other person having lawful care or charge of her; and it supposes there is a taking, and that that taking is against the will of the person in whose possession she is. It is, then, a taking of a girl, in the possession of someone, against his will. | say that done without lawful cause is wrong, and that the legislature meant it should be at the risk of the taker whether or not she was under sixteen. | do not say that taking a woman of fifty from her brother's or even father's house is wrong. She is at an age when she has a right to choose for herself; she is not a girl, nor of such tender age that she can be said to be in the possession of or under the care or charge of anyone. | am asked where | draw the line; | answer at when the female is no longer a girl in anyone's possession. But what the statute contemplates, and what | say is wrong, is the taking of a female of such tender years that she is properly called a girl, can be said to be in another's possession, and in that other's care or charge. No argument is necessary to prove this; it is enough to state the case. The legislature has enacted that if anyone does this wrong act, he does it at the risk of her turning out to be under sixteen. This opinion gives full scope to the doctrine of mens rea. If the taker believed he had the father's consent, though wrongly, he would have no mens rea; so if he did not know she was in anyone's possession, nor in the care or charge of anyone. In those cases he would not know he was doing the act forbidden by the statute an act which, if he knew she was in possession and in care or charge of anyone, he would know was a crime or not, according as she was under sixteen or not. He would not know he was doing an act wrong in itself, whatever was his intention, if done without lawful cause . . .. Denman, J . . .. Bearing in mind the previous enactments relating to the abduction of girls under sixteen, and the general course of the decisions upon those enactments, and upon the present statute, and looking at the mischief intended to be guarded against, it appears to me reasonably clear that the word \"unlawfully,\" in the true sense in which it was used, is fully satisfied by holding that it is equivalent to the words \"without lawful excuse,\" using those words as equivalent to \"without such an excuse as being proved would be a complete legal justification for the act, even where all the facts constituting the offence exist.\" Cases may easily be suggested where such a defence might be made out, as, for instance, if it were proved that he had the authority of a Court of competent jurisdiction, or of some legal warrant, or that he acted to prevent some illegal violence not justified by the relation of parent and child, or school-mistress, or other custodian, and requiring forcible interference by way of protection. In the present case the jury find that the defendant believed the girl to be eighteen years of age; even if she had been of that age, she would have been in the lawful care and charge of her father, as her guardian by nature. Her father had a right to her personal custody up to the age of twenty-one, and to appoint a guardian by deed or will, whose right to her personal custody would have extended up to the same age. The belief that she was eighteen would be no justification to the defendant for taking her out of his possession, and against his will. By taking her, even with her own consent, he must at least have been guilty of aiding and abetting her in doing an unlawful act, viz. in escaping against the will of her natural guardian from his lawful care and charge. This, in my opinion, leaves him wholly without lawful excuse or justification for the act he did, even though he believed that the girl was eighteen, and therefore unable to allege that what he has done was not unlawfully done, within the meaning of the clause. In other words, having knowingly done a wrongful act, viz. in taking the girl away from the lawful possession of her father against his will, and in violation of his rights as guardian by nature, he cannot be heard to say that he thought the girl was of an age beyond that limited by the statute for the offence charge against him. He had wrongfully done the very thing contemplated by the legislature: He had wrongfully and knowingly violated the father's rights against the father's will. And he cannot set up a legal defence by merely proving that he thought he was committing a different kind of wrong from that which in fact he was committing. BRreTT, J ... . [l]f the facts had been as the prisoner, according to the findings of the jury, believed them to be, and had reasonable ground for believing them to be, he would have done no act which has ever been a criminal offence in England; he would have done no act in respect of which any civil action could have ever been maintained against him; he would have done no act for which, if done in the absence of the father, and done with the continuing consent of the girl, the father could have had any legal remedy .. .. Upon all the cases | think it is proved that there can be no conviction for crime in England in the absence of a criminal mind or mens rea. Then comes the question, what is the true meaning of the phrase? | do not doubt that it exists where the prisoner knowingly does acts which would constitute a crime if the result were as he anticipated, but in which the result may not improbably end by bringing the offence within a more serious class of crime. As if a man strikes with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do grievous bodily harm, and kills, the result makes the crime murder. The prisoner has run the risk. So, if a prisoner [does] the prohibited acts, without caring to consider what the truth is as to facts as if a prisoner were to abduct a girl under sixteen without caring to consider whether she was in truth under sixteen he runs the risk. So if he without abduction defiles a girl who is in fact under ten years old, with a belief that she is between ten and twelve. If the facts were as he believed he would be committing the lesser crime. Then he runs the risk of his crime resulting in the greater crime. It is clear that ignorance of the law does not excuse. It seems to me to follow that the maxim as to mens rea applies whenever the facts which are present to the prisoner's mind, and which he has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe to be the facts, would, if true, make his acts no criminal offence atall .. .. 1. Does the statute say that Prince has to know anything to be convicted of the crime? Suppose the statute read: \"It shall be a misdemeanor to knowingly take an unmarried girl, being below the age of 16, out of the possession and against the will of her father.\" Would this clarify whether Prince could be convicted if he mistakenly believed Annie Phillips was over 16? 2. Note that Prince was decided only a few years before Faulkner. Do the two decisions seem consistent? What accounts for the different outcomes of the two cases? Do the two courts view malicious damage and abduction of a minor as different kinds of offenses? Do they view accident and mistake as different kinds of defenses? Do they employ different conceptions of mens rea? 3. Compare the four opinions in Prince. Which, if any, of the judges would hold Prince guilty regardless of his moral blameworthiness? As for those who would not, how would they determine whether Prince was blameworthy? Does blameworthiness mean any more or less than exhibiting the culpable state of mind implicitly required by the statute? Which opinion is most persuasive? 4. Judge Blackburn offers an interesting argument that the legislature could not have intended knowledge of the victim's age to be an element of 55 of the statute, because 51 of the same statute punishes sexual abuse of a child between the ages of 10 and 12. Thus, requiring knowledge of the victim's age would allow the defendant to avoid liability by claiming he thought the victim was under 10 (rather like the earlier absurdity of the man avoiding liability for wounding Crispe with intent to disfigure by claiming he intended to kill, p. 220, supra). Would Judge Blackburn's conclusion follow if 51 had punished sexual abuse of a child \"under the age of 12\" rather than \"above the age of 10 and under the age of 12\"7 Is it possible the legislature intended a mistake about age to acquit the defendant only if it showed he was not morally culpable? Is that Judge Brett's interpretation of the statute? Is it Judge Bramwell's? 5. Consider Judge Brett's opinion, arguing that Prince was unpunishable because the act he believed he was committing was no crime. Brett approves of punishing for a \"greater crime\" one who, if the facts were as he believed, would be guilty only of a \"lesser crime.\" If Prince deserves to be judged on the basis of the act he thought he was committing, why not the felon who reasonably believes he is committing only a misdemeanor? Is it because, unlike Prince, the latter knows his action is \"unlawful\"? 6. Bramwell's \"doctrine of mens rea.\" Consider Judge Bramwell's opinion, arguing that even if Phillips were as old as she allegedly claimed to be, Prince acted immorally. Judge Bramwell claims that his rationale for convicting Prince gives \"full scope to the doctrine of mens rea.\" What does he mean by this? What is his conception of that doctrine? Recall that while the Model Penal Code insists that the defendant must have a culpable mental state with respect to every "material element,\" including the absence of justifying circumstances, traditional doctrine limits the mental element of the offense to knowledge or attitudes about conduct, circumstances and results defining the offense. What conduct and circumstances define the statutory offense here? Can we assume that any circumstance mentioned in the statute is part of the definition of the offense? Or could some circumstances be justifying circumstances? Suppose the statute read as follows: \"It shall be a misdemeanor to take an unmarried girl out of the possession and against the will of her father. Such taking shall be lawfully justified if in execution of a warrant; if necessary to prevent the imminent injury or unlawful abuse of the girl; or upon the consent of the girl, she being at least 16 years of age.\" Would the age of the girl be part of the \"act element\" of this statute? If Prince's mistake was about a justifying condition, would \"the doctrine of mens rea\" afford Prince a defense? Now reconsider the actual statute under which Prince was charged. Is it clear that the age of the girl is part of the definition of the offense rather than a circumstance precluding the assertion of consent as a justification? Finally, if we assume that the age of the girl was not part of the definition of the offense, would it be necessary to argue, as Judge Bramwell does, that Prince's conduct, though mistaken, was immoral? Here are three different ways to understand Judge Bramwell's argument: Gloss #1: The \"doctrine of mens rea\" does not require that offenders know all the circumstances defining their offenses. It requires only that offenders deserve punishment. If all the circumstances were as Prince believed them to be, he would have displayed mens rea because his act would have been immoral, though not proscribed by law. Though not punishable, the act Prince thought he was committing would have deserved punishment. Thus, he acted with mens rea. Gloss #2: The \"doctrine of mens rea\" does require that offenders know all the circumstances defining their offenses. But the definition of the offense includes only those circumstances about which a mistake absolves the defendant of moral blame. Prince's mistake about Annie Phillips's age does not absolve him of moral blame; hence, her age is not part of the act element of the offense. Thus, he acted with mens rea. Gloss #3: The \"doctrine of mens rea\" does require that offenders know all the circumstances defining their offense. But it also requires that offenders deserve punishment. It requires acquitting all defendants who are unaware of a circumstance defining the charged offense; and excusing all defendants whose mistakes absolve them of moral responsibility. Prince's mistake did not negate the mental element of the offense, because Annie Phillips's age was not a circumstance defining Prince's conduct as an offense; and Prince's mistake did not excuse him of responsibility because what he thought he was doing was immoral. Hence his conviction gives full scope to the doctrine of mens rea. 7. Several American courts adopted reasoning similar to that of the Prince court in determining the mental element of adultery, statutory rape, and abduction of a minor for purposes of prostitution. One turn-of-the-century American treatise cited several such cases for the general proposition that, \"If a man is engaged in the commission of an immoral act, even though it may not be indictable, and unintentionally commits a crime, it is generally no defense for him to show that he was ignorant of the existence of the circumstances rendering his act criminal.\"

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