Case brief the following case using the provided format. Please be very detailed.

Required Case Brief Format This format is required, and the use of it will assist you in class participation. . What is the case name AND the date of the decision? . What is the court that decided the case? . Who were the parties? . What was the cause of action and what remedy was sought? . What happened procedurally in the case? (any lower court but with focus on this court's decision) 6. What are the essential facts? 7. What is the issue (i.e., what yeso question did the court have to answer to decide this case) and what conclusion on that question did the court hold? 8. What law did the court use to answer the question of the issue? 9. What analysis did the court use to reach those conclusions? 10. Was was the dicta or dissent in this case (if any) oW N Hamer v. Sidway Court of Appeals of New York, 1891. 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256. Appeal from an order of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, made July 1, 1890, which reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term and granted a new trial. This action was brought upon an alleged contract. The plaintiff presented a claim to the executor of William E. Story, Sr., for $5,000 and interest from the 6th day of February, 1875. She acquired it through several mesne assignments* from William E. Story, 2d. The claim being rejected by the executor, this action was brought. It appears that William E. Story, Sr., was the uncle of William E. Story, 2d; that at the celebration of the golden wedding of Samuel Story and wife, father and mother of William E. Story, Sr., on the 20th day of March, 1869, in the presence of the family and invited guests, he promised his nephew that if 217 he would refrain from drinking, using tobacco, swearing, and playing cards or billiards for money until he became 21 years of age, he would pay him the sum of $5,000. The nephew assented thereto, and fully performed the conditions inducing the promise. When the nephew arrived at the age of 21 years, and on the 31st day of January, 1875, he wrote to his uncle, informing him that he had performed his part of the agreement, and had thereby become entitled to the sum of $5,000. The uncle received the letter, and a few days later, and on the 6th day of February, he wrote and mailed to his nephew the following letter: Buffalo, Feb. 6, 1875. W.E. Story, Jr.: Dear NephewYour letter of the 31st ult. came to hand all right, saying that you had lived up to the promise made to me several years ago. I have no doubt but you have, for which you shall have five thousand dollars as I promised you. I had the money in the bank the day you was twenty-one years old that I intend for you, and you shall have the money certain. . . . P.S.You can consider this money on interest. The nephew received the letter, and thereafter consented that the money should remain with his uncle in accordance with the terms and conditions of the letter. The uncle died on the 29th day of January, 1887, without having paid over to his nephew any portion of the said $5,000 and interest. Parker, J. . . . The question which provoked the most discussion by counsel on this appeal, and which lies at the foundation of plaintiff's asserted right of recovery, is whether by virtue of a contract defendant's testator, William E. Story, became indebted to his nephew, William E. Story, 2d, on his twenty-first birthday in the sum of $5,000. The trial court found as a fact that \"on the 20th day of March, 1869, . . . William E. Story agreed to and with William E. Story, 2d, that if he would refrain from drinking liquor, using tobacco, swearing, and playing cards or billiards for money until he should become twenty-one years of age, then he, the said William E. Story, would at that time pay him, the said William E. Story, 2d, the sum of $5,000 for such refraining, to which the said William E. Story, 2d, agreed,\" and that he \"in all things fully performed his part of said agreement.\" The defendant contends that the contract was without consideration to support it, and therefore invalid. He asserts that the promisee, by refraining from the use of liquor and tobacco, was not harmed, but benefited; that that which he did was best for him to do, independently of his uncle's promise,and insists that it follows that, unless the promisor was benefited, the contract was without consideration,a contention 218 which, if well founded, would seem to leave open for controversy in many cases whether that which the promisee did or omitted to do was in fact of such benefit to him as to leave no consideration to support the enforcement of the promisor's agreement. Such a rule could not be tolerated, and is without foundation in the law. The exchequer chamber in 1875 defined \"consideration\" as follows: \"A valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the other.\" Courts \"will not ask whether the thing which forms the consideration does in fact benefit the promisee or a third party, or is of any substantial value to any one. It is enough that something is promised, done, forborne, or suffered by the party to whom the promise is made as consideration for the promise made to him.\" (Anson's Prin. of Con. 63.) \"In general a waiver of any legal right at the request of another party is a sufficient consideration for a promise.\" (Parsons on Contracts, 444.) \"Any damage, or suspension, or forbearance of a right will be sufficient to sustain a promise.\" (Kent, vol 2, 465, 12th ed.) Pollock in his work on Contracts, page 166, after citing the definition given by the exchequer chamber, already quoted, says: The second branch of this judicial description is really the most important one. Consideration means not so much that one party is profiting as that the other abandons some legal right in the present, or limits his legal freedom of action in the future, as an inducement for the promise of the first. Now, applying this rule to the facts before us, the promisee used tobacco, occasionally drank liquor, and he had a legal right to do so. That right he abandoned for a period of years upon the strength of the promise of the testator that for such forbearance he would give him $5,000. We need not speculate on the effort which may have been required to give up the use of those stimulants. It is sufficient that he restricted his lawful freedom of action within certain prescribed limits upon the faith of his uncle's agreement, and now, having fully performed the conditions imposed, it is of no moment whether such performance actually proved a benefit to the promisor, and the court will not inquire into it; but, were it a proper subject of inquiry, we see nothing in this record that would permit a determination that the uncle was not benefited in a legal sense. Few cases have been found which may be said to be precisely in point, but such as have been, support the position we have taken. . . . In Lakota v. Newton, (an unreported case in the superior court of Worcester, Mass.,) the complaint averred defendant's promise that \"if you (meaning the plaintiff) will leave off drinking for a year I will give you