Case Brief the following: Saucier ex rel. Malory v. McDonald's Restaurants of Mont., Inc., 342 Mont. 291, 97 P.3d 481 (2008)

Facts - nutshell version of what the dispute was about (who did what to whom and why) Procedural Posture - what is the claim, at what stage in the process is the case, how did the lower court rule and why?

Legal Issue - what is the legal issue(s) that must be decided by the court to resolve the dispute? The court typically states the issue explicitly. Understanding the issue is essential to learning the law involved. Rules - what legal principles, standards, definitions and rules does the court discuss or explain? Holding (including Disposition) and Rationale - what does the court decide? You should be looking for what the court holds regarding the legal issue and the concrete dispute presented in the case. Disposition simply means what did the court order - remand, affirmance, et cetera. Rationale focuses on the court's reasoning, particularly regarding any legal principles in dispute. Takeaway - why is this case in the book? What did you learn about the law and its application?

B. Saucier ex rel. Mallory v. Mcdonald's Restaurants of Mont., Inc., 342 Mont. 291, 79 P.3d 481 (2008) Factual and Procedural Background Saucier was born in Billings, Montana on September 9, 1977. The record indicates that six months after her birth she became afflicted with spinal meningitis which significantly and permanently impaired her brain function.In December of 1989, shortly after Saucier had reached the age of twelve, the Dis- trict Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, found her to be \"seriously mentally ill\" and ordered her committed to Rivendell Psychiatric Center in Billings pursuant to 53-21-127, MCA....... During the subsequent years, Saucier resided in several residential treatment homes in Montana, Wyoming, and Idaho. When she reached the age of eighteen, Saucier was placed at the Milk River Group Home in Glasgow, Montana. The records from her time at this institution state that she was assessed by staff members as being \"at risk of emotional, physical, sexual and financial exploitation.\" The record indicates that in 1998, when Saucier reached the age of twenty-one, she returned to Billings. Thereafter, she was able to live on her own in an apartment pro- vided by the Billings Housing Authority, with monitoring and assistance provided by local YWCA officials apparently affiliated with a state sponsored social-services program. Dr. Sheppard''s report also states that \"Saucier's responses resulted in a Full Scale 1Q of 57" which \"places her overall intellectual skills in the Extremely Low range of intellectual functioning or below the first percentile when compared to a group of her same aged peers.\" In October of 2001, shortly after Dr. Sheppard rendered her assessment, Saucier, now twenty-four, applied for employment at the McDonald's restaurant on Central Avenue in Billings. Two friends assisted her in filling out the application, and she was subsequently hired by the restaurant manager, Alex Keeton (\"Keeton\"), to work as a \"lobby person.\" Saucier worked approximately fifteen to twenty hours per week in this \"auxiliary position,\" as McDonald's identified it, which entailed cleaning the dining area and restrooms, and hauling garbage to the dumpster. While she initially worked a lunch-time shift, Saucier was transferred to a shift later in the afternoon because high school students subjected her to teasing during the lunch hour. Approximately four months after Saucier began her job at McDonald's, she became involved in a sexual relationship with Keeton, who was married. Keeton's conduct with Saucier, particularly in regard to his capacity as restaurant manager, and the alleged negligence of McDonald's in connection therewith, are the underly- ing subjects of this litigation. Keeton also admits that he had sexual intercourse with Saucier . . . . The record suggests that Keeton may have changed Saucier's work schedule to facilitate these encounters in the McDonald's vehicle. During the course of the relationship, Keeton admits, he told Saucier that he loved her \"on many occasions.\" Keeton also admits that he knew Saucier was mentally disabled. As Keeton put it, he knew that she was \"unable to solve complex problems.\" Further, Keeton admits that he told Saucier not to tell anyone about their sexual rela- tionship, explaining to her that such disclosure \"could hurt both of us.\" Although Saucier asserts that she \"didn't like\" some of Keeton's advances, and that she asked him to stop at times, she has stated that she was \"in love\" with him. She has also stated that she did not actually love him, and yet told him she did. In explaining why she made this statement to him, Saucier has stated: \"Because I didn't know what else to say. I don't have a good comprehend or speak. I just do what people do.\" In addition to repeatedly telling Saucier that he loved her, Keeton admits he also told her that he might leave his wife and that, if that happened, he \"would like to marry [Saucier].\" Further, according to Saucier, Keeton told her that he could \"have a lot of women\" because he is a Mormon. In late March or early April of 2002, Keeton told Saucier that they could spend time together during a week in April when his wife was scheduled to be out of town. Although he led Saucier to believe that they would spend the entire week together at his residence, Keeton drove Saucier back to her apartment shortly after their sexual encounter, and told her that they would not continue their relationship. Thereafter, Saucier contacted her older sister, Sandra Sanderson (\"Sanderson\"), and reported that she \"was having problems at McDonald's\" with \"a guy named Alex [Keeton].\" According to Sanderson, Saucier reported that \"he had taken [her] off the [work] schedule, Alex did, and she was concerned, because she needed the money.\" Ultimately, Saucier informed Sanderson about the sexual activity between her and Keeton. As noted above, Keeton repeatedly told Saucier he loved her, and also expressed a desire to marry her. The record suggests this had a significant impact on Saucier. As YWCA case-worker Terry Baptiste testified in deposition, Saucier is \"desperate\" for attention. Not surprisingly, Dr. Sheppard determined approximately five months after the relationship with Keeton had ended, that Saucier still \"appears to be fixed on the belief that [Keeton| will honor promises made to her regarding the continua- tion of a more permanent relationship.\" Shortly thereafter, in September of 2002, counsel for Saucier sought Dr. Shep- pard's opinion regarding Saucier's capacity to appreciate the consequences of a sex- ual relationship, her capacity to welcome or reject sexual advances, and her capacity to enter into contracts. In response, Dr. Sheppard opined that while Saucier has the ability to seek out or reject sexual advances, she possesses an \"extremely limited capacity\" to appreciate the consequences attendant to a sexual relationship. Dr. Sheppard also opined that Saucier was not capable of entering into contracts because of \"her state of mild mental retardation and impaired practical/social judgment.\" Based on the various forms of testing, Dr. English determined: \"Her capacity to reason is generally consistent with her IQ and in the range similar to the lower 5 or 6% of the adult population, That is, her reasoning abilities are not unlike those of an 11- or 12-year-old child.\" Despite these findings, however, Dr. English concluded that Saucier has the capacity to consent to a sexual relationship, stating she \"com- mands a basic understanding and knowledge base about sex\" and \"understands the physiological consequences of sexual intercourse to the extent that she utilizes birth control.\" 6 * DEFENSES TO INTENTIONAL TORTS 179 It is well established that although harmful or offensive contact may constitute a battery, effective consent to such contact will bar recovery in tort. Restatement (Second) of Torts 892A(1). However, to be effective, the consent must be rendered by one who has the capacity to consenti.e., the capability to appreciate the nature, extent, and probable consequences of the conduct. Restatement (Second) of Torts 892A(2) cmt. b.7 Here, Mallory alleged that Keeton''s sexual conduct with Saucier was intentional, harmful, and offensive, and that Saucier's disability precluded her from effectively consenting to it. Thus, for the purposes of our analysis on appeal, this allegation will be considered as a claim for the tort of battery. At the heart of this case is the factual allegation that Saucier's disability precluded her from effectively consenting to the sexual conduct of her supervisor, Keeton, in the employment setting. In support of this allegation, Mallory cites, inter alia, evi- dence of Saucier's documented history as a mentally disabled individual; evidence of her limited IQ and limited level of \"adaptive functioning\"; evidence that her disabil- ity puts her at risk of sexual exploitation; and Dr. Sheppard's conclusion that Saucier possesses an \"extremely limited capacity\" to appreciate the consequences attendant to a sexual relationship. In contesting this allegation, McDonald's cites, inter alia, evidence that Saucier \"functions very independently\" by cooking her own meals and doing her own laun- dry at times; evidence that she received sex education while living in a group home; evidence that she has previously engaged in sexual relationships; and Dr. English's conclusion that Saucier \"commands a basic understanding and knowledge base about sex\" and \"understands the physiological consequences of sexual intercourse to the extent that she utilizes birth control.\" Viewing the conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to Saucier, and draw- ing all reasonable inferences in her favor, we conclude that McDonald's has failed to carry its burden of establishing a complete absence of material factual issues regard- ing Saucier's ability to effectively consent. Specifically, we conclude a jury could reasonably find that Saucier's mental disability precluded her from effectively con- senting to sexual conduct with a supervisor in an employment setting, particularly a supervisor with authority over her work schedule. Of course, the contrary evidence relied upon by McDonald's could ultimately be persuasive to a jury. The point is that for purposes of summary judgment analysis, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Saucier's ability to effectively consent, precluding summary disposition of this issue