Case In State v. Metzger (1982), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a Lincoln, Nebraska, city ordinance that made it a crime to \"commit any indecent, immodest, or filthy act\" was void for vagueness. State v. Metzger 319 N.W.2d 459 (Neb. 1982) History Douglas E. Metzger was convicted in the municipal court of the city of Lincoln, Nebraska, of violating 9.52.100 of the Lincoln Municipal Code. The District Court, Lancaster County, affirmed the District Court judgment. Metzger appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the District Court's judgment. KRIVOSHA, CJ. Facts Metzger lived in a garden-level apartment located in Lincoln, Nebraska. A large window in the apartment faces a parking lot that is situated on the north side of the apartment building. At about 7:45 a.m. on April 30, 1981, another resident of the apartment, while parking his automobile in a space directly in front of Metzger's apartment window, observed Metzger standing naked with his arms at his sides in his apartment window for a period of five seconds. The resident testified that he saw Metzger's body from his thighs on up. The resident called the police department, and two officers arrived at the apartment at about 8:00 a.m. The officers testified that they observed Metzger standing in front of the window eating a bowl of cereal. They testified that Metzger was standing within a foot of the window, and his nude body, from the mid-thigh on up, was visible. The pertinent portion of 9.52.100 of the Lincoln Municipal Code, under which Metzger was charged, provides as follows: \"It shall be unlawful for any person within the City of Lincoln . . . to commit any indecent, immodest or filthy act in the presence of any person, or in such a situation that persons passing might ordinarily see the same.\" Opinion The . . . issue presented to us by this appeal is whether the ordinance, as drafted, is so vague as to be unconstitutional. We believe that it is. Since the ordinance is criminal in nature, it is a fundamental requirement of due process of law that such criminal ordinance be reasonably clear and definite. The ordinance in question makes it unlawful for anyone to commit any \"indecent, immodest or filthy act.\" We know of no way in which the standards required of a criminal act can be met in those broad, general terms. There may be those few who believe persons of opposite sex holding hands in public are immodest, and certainly more who might believe that kissing in public is immodest. Such acts cannot constitute a crime. Certainly one could find many who would conclude that today's swimming attire found on many beaches or beside many pools is immodest. Yet, the fact that it is immodest does not thereby make it illegal, absent some requirement related to the health, safety, or welfare of the community. The dividing line between what 1s lawful and what 1s unlawful in terms of \"indecent,\" \"immodest,\" or \"filthy 1s simply too broad to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process. Both lawful and unlawful acts can be embraced within such broad definitions. That cannot be permitted. One is not able to determine in advance what is lawful and what is unlawful. We therefore believe that 9.52.100 of the Lincoln Municipal Code must be declared invalid. Because the ordinance is therefore declared invalid, the conviction cannot stand. Briefing a Case Form Instructions for completing this form: Use this form to answer all the information about the case. Student Name: Case Title History: Facts: Legal Question: Decision: Reasoning: We do not attempt, in this opinion, to determine whether Metzger's actions in a particular case might not be made unlawful, nor do we intend to encourage such behavior. Indeed, it may be possible that a governmental subdivision using sufficiently definite language could make such an act as committed by Metzger unlawful. Reversed and dismissed. Dissent BOSLAUGH, J. , joined by CLINTON and HASTINGS, JJ . The ordinance in question prohibits indecent acts, immodest acts, or filthy acts in the presence of any person. Although the ordinance may be too broad in some respects . . . the exhibition of his genitals under the circumstances of this case was, clearly, an indecent act. Statutes and ordinances prohibiting indecent exposure generally have been held valid. I do not subscribe to the view that it is only \"possible that such conduct may be prohibited by statute or ordinance