Case Study : At 7:40 p.m. on January 25, 1990, Avianca Flight 52 (en route from Bogot to New York City) was cruising at 37,000 feet above the southern New Jersey coast. The aircraft had enough fuel to last nearly two hoursa healthy cushion considering the plane was less than half an hour from touchdown at New Yorks Kennedy Airport. Then a series of delays began. First, at 8:00 p.m. the air traffic controllers at Kennedy told the pilots on Flight 52 that they would have to circle in a holding pattern because of heavy traffic in the area. At 8:45 p.m., the Avianca co-pilot advised Kennedy that they were running low on fuel. The controller at Kennedy acknowledged the message, but the plane was not cleared to land until 9:24 p.m. In the interim, the Avianca crew relayed no information to Kennedy that an emergency was imminent, yet the cockpit crew spoke worriedly among themselves about their dwindling fuel supplies. Flight 52s first attempt to land at 9:24 p.m. was aborted. The plane had come in too low and poor visibility made a safe landing uncertain. When the Kennedy controllers gave Flight 52s pilot new instructions for a second attempt, the crew again mentioned that they were running low on fuel, but the pilot told the controllers that the newly assigned flight path was OK. At 9:32 p.m., two of Flight 52s engines lost power. A minute later, the other two cut off. The plane, out of fuel, crashed on Long Island at 9:34 p.m. Of the 158 persons aboard, 73 were fatally injured. When investigators reviewed the cockpit tapes and talked with the controllers involved, they learned that a communication breakdown caused this tragedy.

In the fourth paragraph of the article, it says "When the Kennedy controllers gave Flight 52s pilot new instructions for a second attempt, the crew again mentioned that they were running low on fuel, but the pilot told the controllers that the newly assigned flight path was OK. " In this case, suggest an ideal communication style, adapting to which may have made the communication process better.