CASE STUDY

BUILDING PROJECT FAILURES

Buildings through the ages have been a significant part of the socio-economic development of civilisation. Olusola et al. (2011, p. 462) record that the first documented building collapse was that of the Tower of Babel. In the modern age, it is not uncommon to hear of building collapse as an everyday issue in various countries around the world. At 7:05 pm on Friday, July 17, 1981, the atrium of the luxurious and most modern hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, United States of America (USA), the Hyatt Regency collapsed with a human life cost that totalled 144 fatalities with approximately 200 recorded injuries.

In this particular accident, it was decided that the responsibility for the collapse could mainly be attributed to the structural engineers. After further investigation, it was discovered that dangerous design suggestions had been made by the contractors, aimed at simplifying the construction of the walkways which later collapsed, proving fatal because these suggested changes had gone unnoticed by the design engineers.

Furthermore, on 11 May 2013, a four-storey building project collapsed in Nigeria's commercial capital Lagos, killing at least four construction workers and leaving around 50 injured. The incident occurred during construction on the prestigious Victoria Island, in a lagoon set back from the Atlantic, home to some of Africa's most expensive real estate. This caused massive economic and social losses. In another tragedy, 13 bodies were pulled from the wreckage of a building under construction that collapsed in a coastal village in the popular Indian tourist state of Goa on Saturday, 4 January 2014.

In relevant news reports, this type of catastrophes highlighted substandard construction of buildings among other project quality related issues. Collected studies by the British daily newspaper, The Guardian indicate that 2651 people were killed across India in 2012 due to collapse of 2737 structures, including houses and bridges. Real estate experts in the area note that many buildings collapse due to construction codes not being adhered to and poor attention to construction health and safety (News24, 2014).

In specific terms, the frequency of building collapses in South Africa has been on the increase. On 18 August 2014, a building collapsed during renovation construction in the upmarket Meyersdal, Eco Estate, Johannesburg, South Africa

(News24, 2014: online). A total of seven people died and nine were injured. In reports, the building collapsed from the roof down, entombing workers who were busy renovating the R9 million building. One of the most recent events is the Tongaat

Mall building collapse, which occurred on 19 November 2013, in the town of Tongaat, KwaZulu-Natal. It was recorded that a concrete slab collapsed on top of workers that were busy with activities on the site. The incident killed two people and injured 29 others and there have been various inquiries that have been conducted on this occurrence.

Tongaat Mall Collapse

The Tongaat Mall building collapse which occurred on 19 November 2013, in the town of Tongaat, KwaZulu-Natal. It was recorded that a concrete slab collapsed on top of workers that were busy with activities on the site. The incident killed two people and injured 29 others. Windapo & Rotimi (2012, p. 284) state that the issue of building collapse during and after construction has failed to receive the attention it deserved from public and private clients and other construction sector stakeholders.

As stated in the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) report (2009a), South Africa is not deficient in terms of OH&S (Occupational Health and Safety) legislation. It furthermore elucidates that the South African legislative framework addresses H&S at various levels. However, Windapo (2013, p. 69), citing the CIDB report (2009a), Geminiani and Smallwood (2008:p. 1) and MBSA (2013, p. 11), indicated that contractors in South Africa do not comply fully with H&S regulations amidst of all the efforts made by the Department of Labour (DoL) and stakeholders (Geminiani, Smallwood, 2008, p. 1).

A marginal decrease in construction accidents and/or construction fatalities has been seen over the years. Therefore, while the statuary framework for designing and constructing buildings is well entrenched within a reasonably well defined authoritative control system, deficiencies within the system itself do exist, particularly as a result of changing technological and environmental circumstances. Government has invested in extensive legislative measures to counter these catastrophes (Olusola et al., 2011, p. 462).

Olusola et al. (2011, p. 463) see building codes as legal requirements, the purpose of which is to promote good practice in the design and construction of buildings in the interest of the health, safety and welfare of its occupants. However, control measures seem to be insufficient - in fact, seriously deficient if not non-existent, and mainly delegated to the individual entities assuming responsibility for their work, but with limited liability This situation is not limited to a single country, but certainly more pertinent in the developing world. Recent occurrences in South Africa opened concerns as to the efficiency of the South African system.

Structural failure is defined by Yates and Lockley (2002, p. 9) as "the reduction of the capability of a structural system or component to such a degree that it cannot safely serve its intended purpose". Yates and Lockley (2002, p. 8), Barrister (2012, p. 40) and Wardhana and Hadipriono (2003, p. 151) are all of the opinion it is clear that much can be learnt through the failure of a structure rather than a study of structures which are successful. The proper appreciation of the causes of failure will assist professionals in refocusing their conceptual understanding of structural behaviour.

Through research, it was established that the most prolific teachings in engineering judgments are obtained from studying case history failures, which point out without question, examples of bad judgment. The case studies provide guideposts for negotiating around pitfalls in conceptual design (Yates & Lockley, 2002, p. 8). They also provide invaluable insights into potential trip-wires that could lead to disastrous accidents such as building collapse. Yates and Lockley (2002, p. 9) show that structural failures could be due to:

Poor communication between the various construction professionals.

Lack of communication between fabricators and erectors.

Poor workmanship.

Compromises in professional ethics and failure to appreciate the responsibility of a profession.

Other mutual causes of structural failure are considered to be the lack of appropriate professional design and construction experience, especially when innovative structural designs are needed. Other reasons include the intricacy of codes and specifications leading to misinterpretation and misappropriation undeserved belief in calculations and in specified extreme loads and properties, the insufficient provision and evaluation of contract and shop drawings, and inadequate training of field inspectors, and limitations placed on design and construction time (Matthews & Saunders, 2009, p. 59).

Hinze (1997, p. 64) states that cost of accidents (CoA) can be separated into two vital categories: direct and indirect costs. Direct costs are costs that are strictly linked to injuries; they are implicit and can be quantified with precision. Indirect costs also known as concealed costs of injuries with regards to construction workers and could be defined as costs of which no historical record or reclamation mechanism is in place. All these costs are determined by the severity of the accident (Pillay and Haupt, 2008, p. 457).

Direct costs

Direct costs can be defined as those costs that are insured, in other words costs covered by workers compensation insurance policies. Examples of such costs include transport to a medical facility, medical and supplementary treatment, medication, hospitalization, disability benefits and lost wages incurred by the injured worker. These costs can be reviewed by analysing the historical data contributing to each injury incurred on site. It can therefore be summarized as direct costs being all the costs incurred directly relating to the treatment of the injury and any other compensation in providing relief to the injured worker (Hinze, 1997, p. 64).

Indirect costs

Indirect costs relate to the concealed costs, in such a way that they are not recognized in bookkeeping terms. When costs are accounted for, they habitually do not include the costs linked to schedule delays, administrative over-time costs, lower morale, increased absenteeism, and poor client relations. These hidden costs are not prima facie, so are not obvious. These indirect costs incurred can be much higher than the direct costs as initially estimated (Hinze, 1997, p. 66). Goetsch (2013, p. 14) and Pillay and Haupt (2008, p. 458), establish that indirect costs include:

Sluggish productivity for both the injured worker upon returning to work and the workforce

Clean-up costs

Replacement costs

Stand-by costs

Cost of overtime

Administrative costs

Replacement worker orientation

Costs resulting from delays

Supervision costs

Costs related to rescheduling

Transportation

Wages paid while injured is idle.

Contractors

Two people died and 29 people were injured.

Sipho Mbuyisa, whose company Mbuyisa Steel Fixing Services CC was responsible for all the steel required in the construction, testified that his team had fitted 19 steel bars in the beam.

This had been done in accordance with the engineer's plans.

The inquiry is headed by the labour department's occupational health and safety manager Phumudzo Maphaha.

Maphaha asked Mbuyisa: "What if I told you that there were only seven Y32 bars?" Mbuyisa replied: "I would be shocked sir.

I would not know where those [12] beams went." Maphaha's commission is investigating the collapse.

He is being helped by co-presiding officers Sandile Kubheka and Lennie Samuel, a forensic investigator and organiser.

Recommendations

The commission is expected to prepare a report of its findings and formulate recommendations to be presented to the labour minister and the National Prosecuting Authority for consideration.

On March 10, the commission along with engineers, conducted a site visit to the mall that was being constructed by Gralio Precast.

The commission previously heard from site foreman Ronnie Pillay that a concrete slab sagged by 7cm in the days leading up to the collapse.

Permission to build the mall was never obtained and the eThekwini municipality had obtained a court order stopping the development.

However, building continued and the mall was scheduled to open in March this year.- Sapa

Summary

Two people were killed and 29 people injured when a section of the mall collapsed during construction on November 19 2013.

The neck of a column exploded, causing the concrete slab it was supporting to collapse and crush the two workers.

The background to the construction was that:

- Rectangle Property Investment bought the stand on 263 Gopallala street in Tongaat in 2012 from Strathmore Property Investment Trust;

- Included in the purchase were plans not approved since its first submission on January 31 2007 by Strathmore;

- In February 2013 an application to start earthworks was made. It was rejected on March 20 2013;

- Because the earthworks application was rejected, the building plans could not be approved;

- Excavation work was already at an advanced stage on March 8 2013 even though plans had not been approved;

- Gralio Precast appointed Axion Consulting Engineers Services as the design engineer for the project when it was under Strathmore;

- Rectangle Property Investment then engaged the services of Gralio Precast as an agent and principal contractor to perform all construction work.

The department found:

- The poor construction of beam 7 triggered the collapse;

- Piles for some of the columns had been overloaded and under-designed;

- A lack of supervision of construction work;

- Failure to appoint a competent supervisor for the construction work;

- Lack of knowledge to execute the complex, interdependent structure;

- Defective materials such as cement imported from Pakistan that did not meet SA Bureau of Standards requirements;

- Failure to prepare and work from drawings; and

- Poor construction methods.

Question 1

Against the background provided in the case study, you have been requested by the Engineering Council as a project quality expert to submit a report on the building project collapse of Tongaat Mall which occurred on 19 November 2013 from a project quality context addressing the main issues which contributed to the occurrence and how this could have been averted. Some of the questions and areas to be addressed in the report are provided in the section below.

1.1 Please provide an Executive Summary for the Case Study and Tongaat Mall Collapse (15 marks).

Please answer critically and in detail.