Catastrophic Events and Retroactive Liability Insurance: The Case of the MGM Grand Fire Stephen P. Baginski Richard B. Corbett William R. Ortega* This study examines the capital market response to the MGM Grand fire and to the announcement of MGM Grand's purchase of $170 million in retroactive liability insurance. The information transfer effect is also examined. Event study research methods support earlier findings that the news of the fire had an adverse effect on MGM's security price. Security prices of industry co-member firms, however, experienced a negative information transfer (positive returns) on the date of the fire, a result consistent with intra-industry shifts in market share. Shifts in systematic risks were not documented for MGM or a portfolio of industry co-members. Catastrophic Events and Retroactive Liability Insurance: The Case of the MGM Grand Fire Recent analytical papers have developed the conditions under which an insured's purchase of retroactive liability insurance is economically advanta- geous. Smith and Witt (1985) argue that tax arbitrage enables the insured to share in the insurer's immediate income tax reductions for loss reserves. Venezian and Fields (1987) identify additional shared economic benefits derived from differential expectations of ultimate loss and the insurer's comparative advantage in dealing with losses. These arguments imply a favorable capital market response to the announcement of a retroactive insurance purchase. However, it is possible that a retroactive insurance purchase has an additional role in determining firm value. If the capital market is unsure about the probability and amount of loss related to the insured risk, the retroactive insurance agreement may provide a reliable dollar estimate of a significant portion of the loss. Thus, the insurance policy serves to adjust the capital market's initial estimate of probable loss. *Stephen P. Baginski is Associate Professor of Accounting and Richard B. Corbett is Professor of Risk Management and Insurance at The Florida State University. William R. Ortega is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at Colorado State University. The comments received from two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged.2.43 The Jonrnrrf ofRisk and Insurance This study examines the capital market response to the MGM Grand fire and to the announcement of MGM Grand's purchase of lili'tl million in retroactive liability insurance to help cover the costs of potential liability claims resulting from the fire. The notion that information about catastrophic loss results in security price changes for the announcing rm is developed and empirically demonstrated in Sprechet and Pertl {1933. 1933}. Evidence that such losses have industry-wide impact [information transfer] is provided by Bowen, Castanias, and Daley {1933) and Hili and Schneeweis {1932}. The information transfer effect is also examined in this study because of its potential to differentiate, at least partially, between ii the market's interpretation of the economic advantages of retroactive insurance; and 2) the market's use of the insurance announcement to determine the extent of loss. The former is. firmspecic while the latter may have industry impact due to competitive shifts within the industry or changes in industry risk. Thus, a finding of information transfer relating to both the fire and the retroactive insurance announcement would be indicative of the market using a retroactive insurance announcement to adjust expectations of probable loss. The results of this study are consistent with previous research in that the news of the fire had an adverse effect on MGM's security price. The security prices of industry ctr-member firms were affected in the opposite direction {negative information transfer} on the date of the fire. a result consistent with intraindustry shifts in market share. Also, MGM experienced a statistically significant negative unexpected security return associated with the retroactive insurance purchase. Once again. industry ctr-members experienced significant. unexpected returns in the opposite direction. Shifts in systematic risk were not documented for MGM or the portfolio of industry co-members. The interpretation of these results is that the securities market used the retroactive insurance annmtnecmcnt to adjust expectations of probable less. This interpretation is supported by an identical pattern of information transfer around the date of the fire and around the date of the retroactive insurance purchase. This result does not reject the economic advantages hypotheses of Smith and Witt {1935} and 1||r'eneZian and Fields {198?}, and in fact, highlights the role of market expectation of loss on the insured risk in future tests of the hypotheses. Hypotheses Economic Effects of a Catastrophic Loss Sprecher and Pertl {1983] argue that the occurrence of a large loss from a catastrophic event adversely affects the value of the firm because of the inability of the firm's insurance coverage to absorb the full amount of the loss. additionally, the loss of income from a reduction in productive capacity may occur. They document that firms experiencing a large loss from a catastrophic event sustained an immediate adverse effect on their stock price. A uniqrrc feature of the loss associated with the MGM fire is that: the magnitude of the liability, property, and earnings loss was not known on the Catastrophic Evcncs and Retroactive Liability Insarrtncc 249 date of the fire. Rather, the magnitude of the loss became apparent after the receipt of subsequent information, This suggests the potential for significant MGM stock price reactions to occur not only on the day of the fire but on subsequent announcement days as well. Although the total loss was not determinable on the day of the fire, it is hypothesized that the announcement of the fire would have an adverse effect on MGM's stock price because of the high probability that MGM would eventually incur a significant loss. Thus, the null hypothesis is tested against the directional alternative of a negative association. Hm: The announcement of the MGM fire did not have an immediate effect on the unexpected security returns of MGM. economic affects of Retroactive Insurance it is unlikely that MGM would have purchased the retroactive insurance unless it were cost beneficial to do so. To the extent the market interpreted the insurance purchase as decreasing MGM's eventual loss from litigation. then a positive stock price reaction would he expected on the day of the announcement- Alternatively, it is possible that the purchase of the retroactive insurance may have provided the market a signal that MGM's loss front the litigation was going to he larger {smaller} than originally expected. The actual amount and the timing of any payments to be made with respect to the litigation were unknown. Reports cited liability claims in excess of $1 billion, whereas MGM had only $3t} million of liability coverage (Lancaster, HELL] From this perspective, the insurance purchase could be viewed as \"had\" [\"good\"} news and would be associated with a negative (positive) stock price reaction. These opposing views of the stock market reaction lead to testing of the following null hypothesis against a non-directional alternative. Hm: The announcement of the purchase of retroactive liability insurance did not have an immediate effect on the unexpected security returns of MGM. Intro-Industry informctr'rm transfer affects lntraindustry information transfer occurs when information releases made by one firm affect the security prices of other, similar firms. The existence of information transfer has been associated with various types of information releases. Of particular interest to this study are the information transfer effects associated with catastrophic events. Previous research (Bowen. Castanias, and Daley, 1933: and Hill and Schneeweis, 1932] has documented 'The uncertainty surrounding the 1otal impact of the fin: is evident from subsequent Wd'ff Street Journal announcements. For instance, in the ittitial announcement of the fire, MGM officials stated that the hotel-casino would be closed for over seven months: however, the amount of the fire-related income loss covered by the firm's business interruption insurance was unknown. Additionally, no reconstruction estimates were available at this time. later announcements provided addhiona] information: on the extent of the toss and MGM's insurance coverage. 150 The Journal of Risk and Insurance the existence of positive information transfer associated with the nuclear accident at ri"hree Mile Island. A primary motivation for them studies was that the accident increased public concern about the safety of nuclear plants and intensified regulatory activity in the electric utility industry. Positive information transfer was hypothesized because the changes in attitudes resulting from the accident ntay have lead to increased uncertainty about the level and variability of future cash flows for all firms in the industry. For instance, the accident had the potential to result in extended plant shutdowns and increased costs to meet stricter regulations for all firms in the electric utility industry. The information transfer associated with the MGM re has also been examined (see Sprecher and Pertl, 1933}. Similar to the Three Mile Island studies, the basis for hypothesizing positive information transfer was the potential decrease in similar firms' expected future cash flows due to the increased costs associated with improving fire safety in the hotel-casino industry. In contrast to the positive transfer documented with the Three Mile Island accident, Sprecher and Pertl nd no evidence of information transfer associated with the MGM fire.1 Although the evidence from the Three Mile Island accident suggeSts the potential for positive information transfer associated Wlll'l catastrophic events, the possibility of differential information transfer among firms also exists. Foster {1931) states that information releases by one firm in an industry can convey positive information for some rms in the industry, negative information for others, and possibly no information transfer for some firms. The prediction of positive information transfer is based on the notion that information releases of one firm are reflective of industry-wide commonali ties. Therefore, positive information transfer tnay be associated with the MGM fire if all firms in the hotel-casino industry were affected similarly by the information releases. In contrast, negative information transfer is based on the notion that rms in the same industry are involved in a constant surn game. Thus. positive {negative} information releases of one firm may convey information about competitive shifts within an indUstry and may convey negative {positive} information to other firms in the industry {see Foster, test}. For instance, the MGM fire resulted in the temporary closing of the damaged Las Vegas hotelcasino and delayed groundbreaking on MGM's planned Atlantic I{Clity hotelcasino. 1f the firms in the hotelveasino industry are involved in a constant sum game, this negative information regarding MGM may provide information on market share shifts in the industry and may be considered \"good" news for other firms in the industry. As a result, there exists the 2This nding may be partially attributable to the presence of negatively correlated market model residuals in their study. This leads to an upward-biased estimate of the standard deviation of the residuals and results in a bias against rejecting the null hypothesis of no information transfer. Catastrophic Events and Retreat-rive Liaoifiry insurance 25] possibility of negative information transfer associated with fire-related announcements made by MGM. It is also possible that information releases contain no information for some of the firms in the industry. That is. the announcements may have neither provided information on industryawide commonalities nor provided informa- tion on competitive shifts within the industry. This possibility may be partially attributabie to the methodology employed to identify similar firms} The potential for information transfer effects associated with MGM fire-related announcements motivates testing the two null hypotheses against non-directional alternatives for a portfolio of industry co-members in addition to MGM. 1f the same pattern of information transfer is detected in rejecting Hm and H\": for the portfolio of nonreleasers. then the information effects of the retroactive insurance announcements are likely to be related to the market's reassessment of probable loss rather than to the firm-specific economic advantages of retroactive liability insurance. Shifts in Systematic Risk While it is unlikely that a shift in systematic risk resulted from the firmspecific events associated with the MGM Grand fire, a test of such a shift was included in this study. This permits comparison to the results of other studies on catastrophic events discussed earlier. Also. if such a shift is present for MGM or MGM's industry eomembers, formal incorporation of the potential for the shift into the econometric model will provide unbiased tests of the effects of postwfire events (retroactive insurance]. Hm: The systematic risk of MGM and industry comembers did not change in the period subsequent to the MGM fire. ' Rmearcll Methods Satanic of Firms and Event Boys For comparison purposes, the sample of firms chosen in this study was the same as that used by Sprecher and Pertl (1938]. The selection criteria employed by Sprecber and Patti were twofold. First, fourdigit SIC code industry classifications were used to identify firms that were in the hotel-casino industry. Second. daily return information for these firms had to 3A common technique used to identify similar firms is on the basis of four-digit SIC codes. However. this may lead to the inclusion of rms with different business risk classes and. varying degrees of sales covariability {see Baginski. I937}. For instance. in a. study of the information transfer associated With management forecasts. Baginslti {1990] found that the existence of information transfer at the four-digit SIC code leuel was driven by nonreleaser rms with sales that covatied highly with releases firrns' sales. No information transfer was found when the sales relationship was low. Similarly. Foster {1931} detected more significant information transfer for firms with a larger percentage of their revenues in the same line of business as the earnings release rms. Therefore, it appears that the ability to detect information transfer is somewhat dependent upon appropriately identifying similar firms. 252 The Journal of Risk and Insurance be available from the Center for Research on Security Prices daily returns tape. This selection criteria resulted in the identification of 15 similar firms {in addition to MGM Grand}. One of these firms, Resorts International, had two classes of common stock which resulted in to securities being included in the information transfer analysis. Appendix 1 contains a list of these lions. The fire event was specied as occuring on two potential dates: {1] November 21, 193i], date of the fire; and {2] November 2.4, 193D, date of announcement of the fire in the Wall Street Journal (WEI). The event date for the public revelation of the retroactive liability insurance is more difficult to determine. The IVS! report date is February 11, 1931. However, Business Insurance also carried the story. Cassidy. Constand. and Corbett {199(1) document that significant single day standardized abnormal returns related to formations or expansions of rislt management departments occur for sample firms 11 trading days before the publication date of Business Insurance. This day corresponds to the publication deadline. Based on this evidence. two approaches were used to specify the retroactive insurance release date. In one model, January .13, 1981 (publication deadline for February s. last issue of Business Insurance} and February 11, test [Hess report date} were designated as the event dates. in a second mode]. a id trading-day event window was constructed beginning on the Monday of the week of the publication deadline [January 19, Hill) and Extending through the W report date [February 11, 1931]. Although this window covers 18 trading days, two days were removed due to MGM fire-related announce ments. There were no MGM announcements reported in the WSJ on the remaining Id days except for the retroactive insurance announcement. Isolation of Security Price Effects a dummy variable technique was used in this study to measure unexpected Security returns for the specified event days. This technique is econometrically equivalent to the procedure traditionally used in event studies to obtain unexpected security returns [see Karafiath. 1933). The traditional procedure consists of two steps. First, ordinary least squares is used to obtain estimates of the market model parameters for each security. Second, unexpected security returns. or abnormal returns, are computed by subtracting the security's estimated return from the security's actual return. That is, n. .1. Step 1: a, : E: + an estimated daily return of security i for day t; lit I-liI 2 actual daily return of securityi for day l; R day t; Catastrophic Events and Retroactive Liabift'ty Insurance 253 who, = estimated market model intercept and slope parameters, respectively; and AR\" = abnormal return for security i for day t. In contrast, the dummy variable approach computes the estimated market model parameters and unexpected security returns in one step. This is accomplished by appending a {I}, I) dummy variable for each event day of interest to the ordinary least squares regression used to estimate the market model parameters. By allowing a dummy variable to equal one on the specified event day, and zero otherwise. the dummy variable coefficient will be exactly equal to the uneapEcted security return computed by the traditional method. Two advantages accrue from the use of the dummy variable technique in the contest of this study. First the economic significance of MGM's eventspecic returns are assessed relative to MGM's normal return-generating process. This occurs because the tsstatistics on the dummy variable coefcients are determined using standard errors derived from MGM's time series of returns. Traditional capilal market approaches use cross-sectional approximations of mean abnormal returns and standard errors, and hence, characterise the economic significance of a single firm's residual return in terms of sarnplerwide rather than f inn-specific residual return variability. Second, the portfolio approach used for the nonrelcascrs avoids the problems of intrasindustry, crosssectional return dependencies, and the resulting problems in interpreting test statistics [see Baginski, 1937; Bernard, 1937). The portfolio approach is equivalent to a properly specified joint generalized least squares estimation of an interdependent system of return-generating equations with a cross-sectional equality constraint on the firm-specific dummy variable coefficients {Schipper and Thompson, IQBBV The following ordinary least squares regressions 1here estimated for MGM and for the portfolio of industry co-niembers: RMGM, = or + a ,tnms + sgeosraama + I": stop + t, in t: 15, ..., U,..., lil'I-I can a, s s + auto} + sgeosrssms + ions + s, a) t= 15fl, ,...,15filrl "r'its discussed by Sprecher and Peri] {1953}. overcoming the potential problem ofces-sectional correlation is sometimcs approached by using Zellncr's seemingly unrelated regression {EUR} technique. The advantage of the SUE. technique is that more efficient parameter estimates are obtained by incorporating the contemporaneous covariances of the residuals into the estimation process. However, when the explanatory variabIcs are the same for all equations, the parameter estimates and standard errors obtained by apptying the EUR technique are identical to those obtained by applying IDLE estimation {see Ktnenta, 1935, p. 539}. As this is the case in this study, lhc application of the SUI-t would not alleviate the bias caused by cross-sectional correlation in the residuals. in contrast, the standard deviation of the residuals based on the portfolio returns will be free from bias due to cross-sectional correlation and tests of information transfer will be unbiased {see Bernard, 1931). 154 The Journal\" of Risk and humane:- where: RMGM, = day t return for MGM Grand {day I} is the date of the fire}, RPNR, 2 day t return for an equally-neighted industry cosmember portfolio, or = intercept, .31 = slope [systematic risk} parameter, .ti2 = increase in postannouncement slope parameter {shift in systematic risk], POST, dummy variable equal to one {zero} in post announcement [proannouncemen period. 1', = dummy variable coefficient on event dayi D\" = dummy variable for event i [of n events] equal to one on day t corresponding to event 1 and zero otherwise, and s, = error term on day t. As indicated earlier, models [1} and {2] were estimated for a singloday analysis and again for an event~window analysis. For both types of analyses, evem l [yielding estimate r1} was the day of the MGM fire and event 2 {yielding estimate 1-3] was the day of the WSJ announcement of the fire. For the single-day analysis, event 3 {as} was defined as the publication deadline for the issue of Business Insurance announcing the retroactive insurance (trading day l l} and event 4 {1-,} was dened as the day of the WSJ announcement of the retroactive insurance.5 For the event window analysis, event 3 [1'3ij was dened as the period of time surrounding the public revelation of retroactive insurance. The window began on the Monday of the week of the publication deadline of Business insurance and ran through the date of the WSJ announcement. The relation of the hypothe5es to the model coefficients is presented in Table 1. Results Effects of Events on MGM Grand Table 2. Panel A presents the singleday analysis of the effect of the fire and subseouent retroactive insurance announcement on the returns of MGM Grand. [in the date of the fire (Friday, 'l'r a.tn. EST}. MGM experienced a signicant negative unexpected return of 2.2.2.8 percent {7. = .222El, t = il.1533, p = .fllltl}. Therefore, He] is rejected in the expected direction for MGM. 5 D1, takes on the value of one on ore-tn day l for event 1 and sew otherwise. D1, takes on the value of one on event day t for cyent 2 and so on. Catastrophic Events and Retroactive Liability Insurance 255 Table 1 Relation of Hypotheses to Model Coefficients Models for Single Day Analysis Dependent Variable = Null Hypotheses Dependent for Model Hypothesis Event Variable Coefficients Ho Date of fire-unexpected return RMOM, Information transfer effect RPNR, 0 WSJ Fire Announcement - RMGM, unexpected return Information transfer effect RPNR, Hoz Publication deadline for BI RMOM, 73= 0 issue containing retroactive insurance accouncement Information transfer effect RPNR. Ta W/SJ retroactive insurance RMGM, TA 0 announcement Information transfer effect RPNR, TA Hos MGM beta shift subsequent to fire RMGM, 32 = 0 Industry beta shift subsequent to fire RPNR, 82 = 0 Models for Event Window Analysis Dependent Variable = a+, (Rm )+ 8,(POST,*R.)+7, D,, + 72Dy + 73EWDEWI + . All same as above except: Null Hypotheses Dependent for Model Hypothesis Event Variable Coefficients Hoz Public revelation of RMGM, T3EW = 0 retroactive insurance Information transfer effect RPNR, THEW = 0 RMGM, = day t return for MGM Grand RPNR, = day t return for an equally-weighted portfolio of MGM Grand industry co-members Rom = equally-weighted market return on day t POST, = dummy variable equal to zero for days -150 to -1 and equal to one for post-fire period (days 0 to 150) D, = dummy variable equal to one on event day and zero otherwise256 The Journal of Risk and Insurance Table 2 Effect of Fire and Subsequent Announcement of Retroactive Liability Insurance on the Risk and Returns of MGM Grand Model: RMGM, = a + 8,(R..)+82 (POST,+R..)+ Er; (D.) +. t = -150, . . . . 0, . . . . 150 Panel A: Single day analysis Model F = 24.457 probability =.0001 RZ =.3329 Adjusted R2 =.3193 Two-tailed Independent Variable Coefficient Estimate 1-statistic probability Intercept -.0002 -.145 8850 Market Return 1.0858 3.861 0001 Beta-shift P2 .3905 993 3214 Date of fire -.2228 -8.688 0001 Date of WSJ fire announcement 72 -.0890 -3.466 0006 Publication deadline for issue of -.0307 -1.203 .2301 Business Insurance announcing retroactive insurance WSJ announcement of retroactive TA -.0564 -2.205 .0282 insurance Panel B: Event window analysis Model F = 29.297 probability =.0001 R2 =.3318 Adjusted R2 =.3205 Two-tailed Independent Variable Coefficient Estimate t-statistic probability Intercept -.0002 -.147 8831 Market Return 3 1 1.0860 3.865 0001 Beta-shift .3967 1.010 .3133 Date of fire -.2227 -8.694 0001 Date of WSJ fire announcement -.0889 -3.467 .0006 Event window beginning four days -.0436 -2.408 0167 before publication deadline for Business Insurance through date of WSJ announcement of retro- active insurance (excluding dates of other events) RMGM, = day t return for MGM Grand Rat - equally-weighted market return on day t POST, = dummy variable equal to zero for days -150 to -1 and equal to one for post-fire period (days 0 to 150) D. = dummy variable equal to one on event day and zero otherwiseCatastrophic Events and Retroactive Linbifr't'y Insurance 257 with respect to the retroactive insurance hypothesis {Hm}, coefficient r; is negative III.'i} but insignificantly different from zero {t = 4.203, p - .23l}. Coefficient r4, however, is negative and significantly different from corn {1'4 2 .564, t -= 4.2%, p = 13232}. Thus Hg1 is rejected because the W3! retroactive insmance announcement was related to nonseto unexpected returns. White a single-day analysis increases the power of an evettt study by avoiding the averaging of significant and nonsigniiicant unexpected returns. two problems are introduced. First, the date of public revelation may be unspecified, introducing a bias in favor of the null. Second, analyzing multiple events as a series of tests of the same hypothesis overstates the significance level of each individual test. Therefore. Panel B of Table 2 presents an eventwindow analysis Coefficient ramp is equivalent to a cumulative unexpected return for the Iii-dayr event window beginning on the Monday preceding the Friday Business Insurance publication date through the WSJ announcement.T Consistent with the Table 2, Panel it results, rm\258 The Journal of Risk and Insurance Table 3 Effect of Fire and Subsequent Announcement of Retroactive Liability Insurance on the Risk and Return of an Equally-Weighted Portfolio of Industry Co-members Model: RMGM, = a + 8,(R.) + 82(POST, +R...) + >.(D..) +. t = -150, . . . . 0, . . . . 150 Panel A: Single day analysis Model F = 42.875 probability = .0001 R2 = .4667 Adjusted R2 = .4558 Two-tailed Independent Variable Coefficient Estimate 1-statistic probability Intercept -.0008 -1.357 1758 Market Return B. 1.3980 11.773 0001 Beta-shift -.0952 -.574 5665 Date of fire .0187 1.733 .0841 Date of WSJ fire announcement TZ -.0054 -.498 .6191 Publication deadline for issue of .0166 1.537 . 1255 Business Insurance announcing retroactive insurance WSJ announcement of retroactive TA .0126 1.168 .2436 insurance Panel B: Event window analysis Model F = 51.599 probability = .0001 R2 = .4665 Adjusted R? = .4575 Two-tailed Independent Variable Coefficient Estimate 1-statistic probability Intercept -.0008 -1.360 1748 Market Return 1.3982 11.792 0001 Beta-shift -.0943 -.569 .5697 Date of fire 0187 1.736 0835 Date of WSJ fire announcement -.0053 -.498 6190 Event window beginning four days THEW .0146 1.913 .0567 before publication deadline for Business Insurance through date of WSJ announcement of retroactive insurance (excluding dates of other events) RPNR, = day t return for an equally-weighted portfolio of MGM Grand industry co-members Ram = equally-weighted market return on day t POST, = dummy variable equal to zero for days -150 to -I and equal to one for post-fire period (days 0 to 150) D, = dummy variable equal to one on event day and zero otherwiseCatastrophic Events and Retroactive Liability Insurance 259 folio design1 Hm and Hg: are rejected for the industry rte-members in Table 3. Consistent 1.vith the results in Table 2 for MGM, the risk shift hypothesis is not rejected for industry co-members (ii: = -.[i952, t = .5'i':l+ p = .5665 in Panel A. Table 3}. lnlerpretalion of Results and [imitations 1f the \"economic advantages of retroactive insurance" hypothesis is valid and retroactive insurance announcements do not adjust market expectations of probable loss. then positive unexpected returns for MGM are expected. industry co-mcniber reactions would not be expected given the firm-specic nature of retroactive insurance. Negative unexpected returns 1would. imply: {1} that the economic advantages hypothesis was not valid; or [2) that the ret- roactive insurance premium provided an upward adjustment of estimated loss. The negative returns for MGM Grand and the pattern of negative information transfer [positive returns} occurring at both the date of the re and during the period surrounding the announcement of retroactive insurance jointlyr suggest that the securities market used both events as a means of upwards adjustment of [1} expected loss for MGM; and [It] competitive advantage for industry comembers. This further suggests that the potential for retroactive insurance to signal probable loss on an insured risk confounds testing of the economic advantages hypothesis. As with any capital markets study, these conclusions may be contingent upon the returngenerating model used and assumptions about the rapidity of stock price adjustment, Potential limitations specic to this study are the grouping of like firms and the specification of the insurance announcement event date. Appendix 1 Firms Included in the Sample American Motor Inns Caesar's World Elsinore Corporation Golden Nugget Hilton Hotels Corporation Holiday Inns incorporated La Quinta Motor inn Marriott Corporation Prime Motors Inns Ramada Inns Resorts International \"A\" Resorts International \"B\" Show Boat. Inc. United Inns incorporated Webb [Del E.] Corporation Wtat her Corporation