Chapter 7Gender and Family Issues: Title VII and Other Legislation 183CASE 7.6harrisv. forklift systems, inC. 510 U.S. 17 (1993)O'Connor,

J.Teresa Harris worked as a manager at Forklift Systems, Inc., an equipment rental company, from April 1985 until October 1987. Charles Hardy was Forklift's president.... [T]hroughout Harris' time at Forklift, Hardy often insulted her because of her gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos. Hardy told Harris on several occasions, in the presence of other employees, "You're a woman, what do you know" and "We need a man as the rental manager"; at least once, he told her she was "a dumbass woman." Again in front of others, he suggested that the two of them "go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris'] raise." Hardy occasionally asked Harris and other female employees to get coins from his front pants pocket. He threw objects on the ground in front of Harris and other women, and asked them to pick the objects up. He made sexual innuendos about Harris' and other women's clothing.In mid-August 1987, Harris complained to Hardy about his conduct; Hardy said he was surprised that Harris was offended, claimed he was only joking, and apologized. He also promised he would stop, and based on this assurance Harris stayed on the job. But in early September, Hardy began anew: While Harris was arranging a deal with one of Forklift's customers, he asked her, again in front of other employees, "What did you do, promise the guy ... some [sex] Saturday night?" On October 1, Harris collected her paycheck and quit.HarristhensuedForklift,claimingthatHardy'sconduct had created an abusive work environment for her because of her gender. The [trial] Court found this to be a "close case," but held that Hardy's conduct did not create an abusive environment. The court found that some of Hardy's comments "offended [Harris], and would offend the reasonable woman," but that they were not "so severe as to be expected to seriously affect [Harris'] psychological well being." [On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court decision. Harris then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.] We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among [the federal courts of appeals] ... on whether conduct, to be actionable as "abusive work environment" harassment (no quid pro quo harassment issue is presented here), must "seriously affect [an employee's] psychological well-being" or lead the plaintiff to "suffer injury"....Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." As we made clear in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson ... this language "is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination. The phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment," which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment. When the workplace is permeated with

"discriminatory intimidations, ridicule, and insult," that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and is an abusive working environ-ment," Title VII is violated....But Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. Moreover, even without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the discrimina-tory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality.... We therefore believe the District Court erred in relying on whether the conduct "seriously affected plaintiff 's psychological well-being" or led her to "suffer injury." Such an inquiry may needlessly focus the factfinder's attention on concrete psychological harm, an element Title VII does not require. Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seri-ously affect a reasonable person's psychological well-being, but the statute is not limited to such conduct. So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious

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Part 2

Equal Employment Opportunity This is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test. We need not answer today all the potential

questions it raises, nor specifically address the EEOC's new regulations on this subject .

But we can say that whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. The effect on the

employee's psychological well-being is, of course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required.

Forklift, whileconcedingthatarequirementthatthe conduct seriously affect psychological well being is unfounded, argues that the District Court nonetheless

correctly applied the Meritor standard. We disagree. Though the District Court did conclude that the work environment was not "intimidating or abusive to [Harris]," it did so only after finding that the conduct was not "so severe as to be expected to seriously affect plaintiff 's psychological well-being" and that Harris was not "subjectively so offended that she suffered injury." The District Court's application of these incorrect standards may well have influenced its ultimate conclusion, especially given that the court found this to be a "close case."We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

Case Questions

1.

How did the harassment directed against Harris affect her economically? How did the harassment directed against Harris affect her emotionally? Did it interfere with her work performance? Explain your Answers.

2.

How severe must hostile environment sexual harassment be before it violates Title VII?

3.

Is the standard used to determinewhensexualharassment becomes severe enough to a hostile environment a subjective or an objective standard?

Explain your answer.