Check my work In a two-player, one-shot simultaneous-move game each player can choose strategy A or strategy B. If both players choose strategy A, each earns a payoff of $400. If both players choose strategy B, each earns a payoff of $200. If player 1 chooses strategy A and player 2 chooses strategy B, then player 1 earns $100 and player 2 earns $600. If player 1 chooses strategy B and player 2 chooses strategy A, then player 1 earns $600 and player 2 earns $100. a. Write the above game in normal form. Player 2 Player 1 Strategy A B A +A B $ b. Find each player's dominant strategy, if it exists. Player 1's dominant strategy: (Click to select) v Player 2's dominant strategy: (Click to select) v c. Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. (Click to select) vPlayer 1 Strategy 4 A B b. Find each player's dominant strategy, if it exists. Player 1's dominant strategy: |(Click to select) v Player 2's dominant strategy. (Click to select) c. Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. (Click to select) v d. Which strategy pair has the highest aggregate payoff? (Click to select) v e. Can the outcome with the highest aggregate payoff be sustained in equilibrium? (Click to select) vAt a time when demand for ready-to-eat cereal was stagnant, a spokesperson for the cereal maker Kellogg's was quoted as saying., . . . for the past several years, our individual company growth has come out of the other fellow's hide.\" Kellogg's has been producing cereal since 1906 and continues to implement strategies that make it a leader in the cereal industry. Suppose that when Kellogg's and its largest rival advertise, each company earns $1 billion in profits. When neither company advertises, each company earns profits of $7 billion. If one company advertises and the other does not, the company that advertises earns $39 billion and the company that does not advertise loses $3 billion. For what range of interest rates could these firms use trigger strategies to support the collusive level of advertising? Instruction: Enter your response as a percentage rounded to the nearest whole number. = percent Z Drau E Af 1N mms Mawvi %