Question
. Consider a collective action game where P(n) = n, S(n) = 3n + 4, N = 100. (a) Find the Nash equilibrium. (b) Compare
. Consider a collective action game where
P(n) = n, S(n) = 3n + 4, N = 100.
(a) Find the Nash equilibrium.
(b) Compare the payoff players get in equilibrium with the payoff they would get if they all chose P.
(c) What is the social-welfare function for this particular game? What value of n maximizes the function. Why is the maximum not n = 100?
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Econometric Analysis Of Cross Section And Panel Data
Authors: Jeffrey M Wooldridge, J M Wooldridge
2nd Edition
0262232588, 9780262232586
