Consider a game of chicken, in which two people say, James and Dean-drive two very fast cars towards each other from opposite ends of a long straight road. If one of them swerves before the other, he is called a chicken. Of course, if neither swerves, they will crash. The game can be represented in the following payoff matrix below: Washington State University School of Economic Sciences James Swerve Go Straight Swerve 0,0 0, 3 Dean Go Straight 3,0 -10, -10 Note that the first number in the cell is the payoff of Dean, and the second number in the cell is the payoff of James. (a) Show that there are no dominated strategies for neither James nor Dean. (b) Find pure strategy Nash Equilibria in this game. (Hint: There are two psNE.) (c) Draw a sequential form of the game where Dean moves first. Find the NE in this sequential-move game. Do you get the same NE as in part (a)? (d) Now consider James moves first, Draw the new sequential form. Find the NE in this game. Is it the same as in part (b)