Consider a house allocation with existing tenants problem (I, H, R), where I = {a, b, c, d, e} with existing tenants IE = {a,b,c} and new applicants IN = {d, e}, H = {h(a), h(b), h(c), h, h'} with occupied houses Ho= {h(a), h(b), h(c)} (where tenant i owns house h(i)) and vacant houses Hy = {h, h'}, and players' preferences are as follows: Ra h(c) h(b) h' h h(a) ho Rb Re h(c) h(a) h(a) h' Rd Re h(b) h h(c) h(a) h h(b) h(c) h' ho ho ho h h' h(b) h h(c) h(b) h' ho h(a) (a) Consider matching = {(a, h'), (b, h(c)), (c, h(b)), (d, h(a)), (e, h)}. Is individually rational? Is Pareto optimal? (b) Compute the outcome of the you request my house I get your turn (YRMH-IGYT) rule with respect to priority ordering f = (c, b, e, a, d) under pref- erences R = (Ra, Rb, Re, Rd, Re), i.e., compute (YRMH - IGYT) (R). (c) Show that the resulting matching of the YRMH-IGYT rule (the matching (YRMH - IGYT) (R) that you found at part b) is individually rational and optimal.