Consider a market in which there are many potential buyers and sellers of used cars. Each potential seller has one carr which is either of high quality (a plum} or low quality {a lemon]. A seller with a low-quality car is willing to sell it for $5,500, whereas a seller with a high-quality car is willing to sell it for $13,500. A buyer is willing to pay $?,500 for a low- quality car and 515,500 for a high-quality ear. of course, only the seller knows whether a car is of high or low quality, as illustrated in the accompanying image: Suppose that F501. ofsellers have lowquality cars. Assume buyers know that 35% of sellers have low-quality cars but are unable to determine the quality of individual cars. If all sellers ol'fer their cars for sale and Juyers have no way of determining whether a car is a high-quality plum or a lowquality lemon, the expected value of a car to a buyer is S (Hint: The expected value of a car is the sum of the probability of getting a low-quality car multiplied by the value of a lowquality car and the probability of getting a high-quality car multiplied by the value of a highquality car.) Suppose buyers are willing to pay only up to the expected value of a car that you found in the previous question. Since sellers of low-quality cars are willing to sell for $5,500, while sellers of highquality cars are willing to sell for $13,500, V will be willing to participate in this market at that price. The dilemma in this problem is an example ofwhich of the following economic concepts? 0 Signaling Q Molal hazard O Adverse selection 0 Screening