Consider a oligopoly consisting of Firm 1 and Firm 2. The two firms have historically competed on quantity (q), with cost structures of c1(q1) = 10q1 and c2(q2) = 20q2 respectively. The inverse market demand for this product is: P = 100 ? P qi where P equals price

Part A: [5 marks] Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Part B: [5 marks] Determine the Stackelberg equilibrium, assuming Firm 1 is the leader and Firm 2 is the follower.

Question 2 Consider a oligopoly consisting of Firm 1 and Firm 2. The two firms have historically competed on quantity (q), with cost structures of ci(qi) = 10g, and cz(92) = 2092 respectively. The inverse market demand for this product is: P = 100 - E q where P equals price. Part A: [5 marks] Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Part B: [5 marks] Determine the Stackelberg equilibrium, assuming Firm 1 is the leader and Firm 2 is the follower