Consider a second price auction for an object with four bidders with valuations v1 = 20, y = 15, V3 = 10 and 14 = 5 Suppose that the four bidders submit the following bids: b = 8, b2 = 5. b3 = 20 and ba = 5 Given this set of bids, who is winning the auction? What is the price that the winner pays for this object? Is this set of bids a Nash Equilibrium? Explain why or why not. Consider a second price auction for an object with four bidders with valuations v1 = 20, y = 15, V3 = 10 and 14 = 5 Suppose that the four bidders submit the following bids: b = 8, b2 = 5. b3 = 20 and ba = 5 Given this set of bids, who is winning the auction? What is the price that the winner pays for this object? Is this set of bids a Nash Equilibrium? Explain why or why not