Consider a two-sided matching problem between men y 6 {2,4,6} and women x 6 {1,3, 5}. In a match (ac, y), woman :93 payoff is 122g and man y's payoff is (a: 6)2y. The stable match with non-transferable utility is: (a) Positively assortative (b) Negatively assortative (c) Neither positively nor negatively assortative ((1) Not enough information to answer this question. L C R U 6,8 2,6 8,2 M 8,2 4,4 9,5 D 8,10 4,6 6,7 The following actions survive ISD for player 1: Consider the following game: [a] All three of them (b) D only (c) Both M and D ((1) None of these are correct. Again consider the game in question #7. How many pure strategy NE are there? (a) [13) One ( )T (d) Three (e) More than three Consider a second-price auction with 2 players. Player 1 values the object at $10, and Player 2 values it at $6. Each simultaneously submits a bid for the object; the highest bidder wins, and pays the amount of the loser's bid. Loser pays nothing. Which of the following are is/ are NE, assuming that P1 wins in a tie: (a) P1 bids 10, P2 bids 10. (1)) P1 bids 10, P2 bids 0. (c) P1 bids 0, P2 bids 10. [(1) Two of these (0) Three of these Consider the following ultimatum game: rst, Player 1 proposes a share at E [0, 1] of a dollar for Player 2. Then, Player 2 either accepts or rejects. If he accepts, the dollar is divided as suggested: P1 gets $1-x and P2 gets $x. If he rejects, both players go home with $0. However, Player 2 is known to be an envious spiteful type: his payoff from accepting a share 2: of the dollar is _1 if a;